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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit at-
tracted much attention in the taxation area during its past term. I While
not hearing a large number of cases, 2 a few of the cases decided have
attracted a fair amount of publicity. This article will first discuss a
case3 where the Seventh Circuit concluded that a long-standing dictum
of the United States Supreme Court4 was no longer good law. The
dictum provided that a grant by a corporation to its shareholders of
rights to purchase its property cannot constitute a dividend because the
mere grant of rights does not diminish the assets of the corporation.
Second, this article will focus on a case 5 which touched on the question
of whether it is proper to look to the partnership's trade or business or
to each individual partner's trade or business in determining whether
start-up expenses must be capitalized or expensed. Included in this
analysis will be those issues which the Seventh Circuit failed to con-
sider and which will affect the precedential impact of a case which al-
* Associate, Arvey, Hodes, Costello & Burman, Chicago, Illinois. A.B., University of Illi-
nois at Urbana-Champaign; J.D., University of Chicago Law School.
** Associate, Arvey, Hodes, Costello & Burman, Chicago, Illinois. B.S., University of Penn-
sylvania; M.B.A., DePaul University; J.D., IIT/Chicago Kent College of Law; Illinois C.P.A.
1. This article addresses tax cases decided by the Seventh Circuit during the period June 1,
1980, to May 31, 1981.
2. Tax cases decided this term by the Seventh Circuit other than those discussed in this
article include Fleming v. United States, 648 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1981) (penalties for late filing of
estate tax return); Fine v. United States, 647 F.2d 763 (7th Cit. 1981) (deductions for personal use
of resort condominium); Candela v. United States, 635 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1980) (tax fraud);
Brantingham v. United States, 631 F.2d 542 (7th Cit. 1980) (inclusion of life estate in gross estate
of decedent); Campagna-Turano Bakery, Inc. v. United States, 632 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980) (prior-
ity of tax liens); Speca v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1980) (taxability of income to
parents where transfer of stock to children); United States v. Baskes, 631 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1980)
(tax fraud); United States v. Moore, 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981)
(tax fraud); Evangelista v. Commissioner, 629 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1980) (transfer of property with
liabilities in excess of basis).
3. Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913
(1981). See text accompanying notes 13-88 infra.
4. Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63 (1937).
5. Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980). See text ac-
companying notes 89-119 infra.
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ready is being cited. 6 Third, an Employee Retirement Income Security
Act 7 case 8 will be analyzed in light of congressional intent in the crea-
tion of individual retirement accounts9 and of changes enacted by the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198110 which will eliminate the issue in
future years. This article concludes with a section on developments in
the law which discusses a case involving the tax benefit rule" and a
case concerning the definition of wages for employment tax purposes
where the result reached by the Seventh Circuit was approved by the
United States Supreme Court.'
2
TAXABILITY OF THE RECEIPT BY SHAREHOLDERS OF RIGHTS TO
ACQUIRE CORPORATE PROPERTY
In Redding v. Commissioner,m3 the Seventh Circuit faced one of the
more delicate tasks that occasionally confront the appellate courts: that
of disposing of a Supreme Court precedent which has long outlived its
usefulness but which has never been formally overruled. The prece-
dent in question was the Supreme Court's famous dictum in Palmer v.
Commissioner'4 that a corporation's grant to shareholders of rights to
purchase its property cannot constitute a dividend because the mere
grant of rights does not diminish the corporation's assets. Aided by the
virtually unanimous opinion of commentators' 5 and a broad hint from
6. Blitzer v. United States, 1981-1 U.S.T.C. 9262 (Ct. Cl. 1981). The Tax Court opinion of
Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521 (1980), has been cited by In re Boyd, 76
T.C. 646 (1981); Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497 (1980); Goodwin v.
Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424 (1980).
7. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) and at I.R.C. §§ 401-415)
[hereinafter referred to as ERISA].
8. Foulkes v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 1105 (7th Cit. 1981). See text accompanying notes
120-71 infra.
9. See I.R.C. § 408 [hereinafter referred to as IRA].
10. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981), reprinted in
[1981] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 172 [hereinafter referred to as ERTA].
Ii. Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 639 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1980); Hillsboro Nat'l Bank
v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3570 (Jan. 19, 1982).
See text accompanying notes 172-187 infra.
12. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, 623 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1980). See text accompany-
ing notes 188-223 infra.
13. 630 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981).
14. 302 U.S. 63 (1937).
15. Carlson, Taxation of 'Taxable' Stock Rights. The Strange Persistence ofPalmer V. Com-
missioner, 23 TAX. L. REV. 129, 140-43 (1968); Whiteside, Income Tax Consequences ofDistribu-
tions of Stock Rights to Shareholders, 66 YALE L.J. 1016, 1028-31 (1957); Comment, Taxation of
Stock Rights, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 146, 150-51 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Comment]. See also
Gann, Taxation of Stock Rights and Other Options.- Another Look at the Persistence ofPalmer v.
Commissioner, 1979 DUKE L.J. 911, 963-64 [hereinafter cited as Gann]; Smith, Rights Offerings of
Portfolio Securities, 26 TAx LAW. 471 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
TAXA TION
the Supreme Court itself,' 6 the Seventh Circuit concluded that Palmer
had not survived the enactment of the 1954 Code.
However, in addition to deciding that the stock rights received by
the Reddings were not insulated from dividend treatment by Palmer,
the court was required to determine whether the issuance of the rights
constituted a taxable event at all, or whether it was an integral part of a
tax-free corporate spin-off under section 355. The court elected to ad-
dress the spin-off issue first, failing to take into account the fact that a
determination of the validity of Palmer was a necessary prerequisite to
analysis of section 355.17 The result of this backwards analysis is an
opinion which properly rid the corporate provisions of the Code of the
Palmer dictum, but which failed to give a clear indication of how sec-
tion 355 should be applied without it.
The transaction which led to Redding began when the Indianapo-
lis Water Company was requested by the Indiana Public Service Com-
mission to divest itself of its real estate development activities, such
activities being deemed inappropriate for a public utility. The .water
company had a wholly-owned subsidiary, Shorewood Corporation,
which was engaged in the ownership and development of the properties
surrounding the reservoirs used by the water company. Rather than
simply distribute the Shorewood stock to its shareholders, the water
company decided to use the transaction to raise additional operating
capital. Accordingly, it distributed to its shareholders warrants to ac-
quire one share of Shorewood stock upon the exercise of two warrants
and the payment of $5.00, an amount which was stipulated to be less
than the fair market value of the stock. The warrants were to be exer-
cised within fifteen days after their issuance, and during this fifteen day
period an over-the-counter market developed in the warrants. The
Reddings were shareholders of the water company and received 7,000
warrants, all of which they exercised to receive 3,500 shares of Shore-
wood.' 8 The issue before the court, however, was whether the receipt
of the 7,000 warrants constituted a dividend to the Reddings at the time
of issuance, regardless of whether the warrants were later exercised,
16. See text accompanying notes 33-34 infra.
17. 630 F.2d at 1173.
18. The case of the Reddings was consolidated with that of Thomas and Anne Moses, who
were also Water Company shareholders. The Moseses, in addition to exercising their primary
subscription rights, also exercised their secondary subscription rights as shareholders to acquire
Shorewood stock not subscribed for in the first offering. They thus acquired some 20,000 shares of
Shorewood stock. This statement of facts is condensed from the Tax Court's opinion. Redding v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 597, 598-601 (1979).
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sold or allowed to lapse.' 9
Palmer v. Commissioner And Its Progeny
The taxability of warrants at the time of issuance had been pre-
cisely the issue addressed by the Palmer dictum. In Palmer, a corpora-
tion had granted to its shareholders, including Palmer, the right to
purchase its portfolio shares20 of another corporation. Palmer exer-
cised his right and the actual issue for the Supreme Court was whether
he had recognized any income on the exercise of the warrants. How-
ever, the Court began its analysis by stating that it was axiomatic that
Palmer had not received a dividend when the rights were granted:
The mere issue of rights to subscribe and their receipt by stockhold-
ers, is not a dividend. No distribution of corporate assets or dimuni-
tion of the net worth of the corporation results in any practical sense.
Even though the rights have a market or exchange value, they are not
dividends within the statutory definition. . . . They are at most op-
tions or continuing offers, potential sources of income to the stock-
holders through sale or the exercise of the rights. Taxable income
might result from their sale, but distribution of the corporate prop-
erty could take place only on their exercise.
2'
The Court went on to hold that although a dividend could occur
when a right to acquire corporate property was exercised, Palmer had
not received a dividend on the exercise of his right. The Court found
that the corporation had intended to fix the purchase price of the port-
folio stock at its fair market value, and thus the transaction was a bona
fide sale between the corporation and its shareholders. 22 The Court
noted that the fact that the stock was actually worth more than what
Palmer paid for it when he exercised his right was the result merely of a
market fluctuation rather than a distribution of profits by the
corporation.
An elaborate edifice of rules regarding the taxation of rights to
acquire corporate property was built upon the foundation of Palmer.
19. There is no indication in either the Tax Court's or the Seventh Circuit's opinion that the
Service argued in the alternative that income should have been recognized on the exercise of the
warrants, which was the issue in the Baan-Gordon litigation. See text accompanying notes 48-59
infra. In fact, the Moseses acquired 4,000 of their Shorewood shares as agents for a third party.
71 T.C. at 601. This presumably means they sold their warrants, which would be a taxable trans-
action even under the Tax Court's reading of I.R.C. § 355, but no mention of this is made in the
Tax Court's opinion.
20. The term "portfolio shares" is often used in cases involving the Palmer issue, and will be
used herein to distinguish between a corporation's distribution of rights to acquire the stock of
other corporations which it owns and its distribution of rights to acquire its own stock.
21. 302 U.S. at 71 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 73.
TAXATION
In the subsequent case of Choate v. Commissioner,2 3 the Second Circuit
held that the corporate intent to grant a dividend which the Supreme
Court found lacking in Palmer was to be determined upon an objective
basis. The practical effect of this rule was that, if there were a "spread"
between the fair market value of corporate property and the exercise
price for rights granted to the shareholders to acquire such property at
the time the rights were granted, the corporation was conclusively
deemed to have intended to grant a dividend. The dividend would not
occur, however, until a right was exercised by the shareholder, at which
time the amount of the dividend was limited to the lesser of the
"spread" on the date the right was granted and on the date the right
was exercised.
24
The following year, in Gibson v. Commissioner,2 5 the Second Cir-
cuit held that if the rights were sold rather than exercised, ordinary
income resulted under the assignment of income doctrine.26 Shortly
thereafter, the Service set forth its understanding of the principles es-
tablished by the Palmer-Choate-Gibson trilogy in General Counsel
Memorandum 25063,27 and a number of cases followed applying these
principles in various situations.2
8
A short time thereafter, Congress undertook a complete revision of
the rules governing corporate transactions in what was to become sub-
chapter C of the 1954 Code. It is noteworthy that the committee re-
ports made no reference to the Palmer doctrine. Moreover, the rules
enacted in subchapter C are at odds with the basic premise of Palmer.
23. 129 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1942).
24. The court reasoned that if the spread increased before the rights were exercised, the in-
crease was merely due to market fluctuations and not to the corporation's intent to grant a divi-
dend, which was determinative under Palmer. On the other hand, the amount of the dividend
could not exceed the amount of the spread at exercise, since Palmer established that no dividend
occurred until that time. 129 F.2d at 687.
25. 133 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1943).
26. The doctrine holds generally that a taxpayer cannot avoid being taxed on income after
the right to receive it has accrued by transferring the right to another party. See, e.g., Helvering v.
Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940).
27. 1947-1 C.B. 45. G.C.M. 25063 agreed that dividend income was realized at the time of
exercise, rather than issuance, of rights to acquire portfolio stock, measured by the spread between
exercise price and fair market value. It is silent on the Choate issue of whether the amount of the
dividend is limited to the lesser of the spread on issuance and exercise, although it expressly states
that the entire amount of income received from the sale of a right is ordinary income (an issue
which was not resolved in Gibson), which is arguably inconsistent with the "lesser of" rule of
Choate. G.C.M. 25063 also held that no loss is recognized on the lapse of a right, which appears
to be correct. See Eastern Shares Corp. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 608 (1935).
28. See, e.g., Tobacco Prods. Export Corp. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 625 (1954), nonacq.,
1955-2 C.B. I I (proceeds from sale of rights eligible for the predecessor to the dividends received
exclusion of I.R.C. § 243); W.G. Maguire & Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 20 (1953) (tax treat-
ment of rights where distributing corporation has no earnings and profits). A good survey of the
progeny of Palmer can be found in Gann, supra note IS.
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All of the revenue acts which preceded the 1954 Code, including
the Revenue Act of 1928, under which Palmer was decided, defined a
dividend as "any distribution made by a corporation to its sharehold-
ers, whether in money or in other property, out of its earnings or profits
accumulated after February 28, 1913." ' 29 The 1954 Code retained this
basic definition of a dividend in section 316(a). However, section
316(a) goes on to provide that any distribution of property to which
section 301 applies shall be treated as a distribution of property for
purposes of section 316(a) and shall be considered a dividend to the
extent that the corporation has earnings and profits at the time the dis-
tribution is made. Section 301 provides comprehensive rules for the
taxation of distributions of property, referring to section 317(a) for the
definition of property. Section 317(a), in turn, provides that property
means "money, securities, and any other property; except that such
term does not include stock in the corporation making the distribution
(or rights to acquire such stock)." The specific exclusion of rights to
acquire a distributing corporation's stock from the definition of prop-
erty negatively implies that rights to acquire a corporation's assets in
general are property. Furthermore, section 305 sets out specific rules
governing the distribution of rights to acquire the corporation's own
stock. Such rights are excluded from taxability by section 305(a), un-
less they fall within one of the exceptions listed in section 305(b). Thus,
section 305, like section 317(a), buttresses the notion that the distribu-
tion of rights to acquire corporate assets is a distribution of property
taxable under section 301. 30
Despite these conceptual inconsistencies, the continued validity of
Palmer was not seriously challenged until the Baan-Gordon litigation.
3'
29. Pub. L. No. 70-562, § 115(a), 45 Stat. 791 (1928). The phrase made its debut in the Reve-
nue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756 (1916).
30. See Smith, supra note 15, at 474-75, for an argument that Congress' probable reason for
excluding distributions of rights to acquire the corporation's own stock from the definition of
property in § 317(a) was to avoid any possible overlap with § 305, rather than to overrule Palmer.
Commentators have also pointed out that the Supreme Court's treatment of rights granted to
shareholders is difficult to reconcile with its treatment of stock options granted to employees under
Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945), and Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956),
which are generally interpreted as implying that an option with a readily ascertainable fair market
value may be taxable as compensation when granted, rather than when exercised. See Gann,
supra note 15, at 941-47. The principles of Smith and LoBue are now codified in I.R.C. § 83. See
note 41 infra.
31. Baan v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 71 (1965),rev'd, 382 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1967), andaffdin
part and rev'd in part sub nom. Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1967), 2d C. rev'd
and 9th Cir. aftd sub nom. Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968), on remand, Baan v.
Commissioner, 51 T.C. 1032 (1969), affdper curiam, 450 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1971), and a 'd sub
nom. Gordon v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1970). This monumental piece of litigation
is discussed in the text at notes 48-59 infra.
TAXATION
The litigation, which is discussed in detail below, involved the qualifi-
cation of a spin-off under section 355 similar to the Redding transac-
tion, except that the Service, assuming the validity of Palmer, assessed
a tax on the exercise, rather than on the issuance, of the warrants.
Baan-Gordon culminated in the Supreme Court.32 The Court began its
opinion by noting that it was clear that a distribution of property had
taken place no later than the date on which the stock warrants were
exercised, which distribution, unless protected by section 355, was a
dividend. 33 Since the Commissioner had not contended that a divi-
dend occurred earlier, this was as far as the Court needed to go in order
to decide the case. However, in a footnote, the Court observed that in
Palmer there had been no difference between the fair market value of
the stock involved and the exercise price of the warrants at the time the
warrants were issued. The question of whether a dividend would result
if such a spread existed, the Court stated, had never been authorita-
tively settled.
34
The Court's treatment of the fundamental premise of its Palmer
analysis as mere dictum and its failure to mention the effect of the in-
tervening enactment of the 1954 Code were somewhat disingenuous.
Nevertheless, the message was clear that the Court would be receptive
to abandoning Palmer and the Service was quick to take the hint by
issuing Revenue Ruling 70-52135 stating that it would regard Palmer as
having been overruled by the enactment of the 1954 Code.
Following Baan-Gordon and Revenue Ruling 70-521, the Fifth
Circuit, in Baumer v. United Slates,36 held that a closely-held corpora-
tion which distributed to its sole shareholder's son an option to acquire
certain real estate which could be expected to appreciate substantially
during the option period had made a constructive dividend. The Fifth
Circuit acknowledged the force of the argument that Palmer should be
considered to have been overruled by the 1954 Code, but, in light of the
substantial differences between the stock rights involved in Palmer and
the real estate option involved in Baumer, the court restricted itself to
stating that Palmer should be limited to its facts.37 In light of these
developments, and a substantial body of commentary rejecting the con-
tinuing validity of Palmer,38 the Seventh Circuit had no difficulty in
32. 391 U.S. 83 (1968).
33. Id. at 89.
34. Id. at 89 n.4.
35. 1970-2 C.B. 72.
36. 580 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1978).
37. Id. at 879.
38. See note 15 supra.
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taking the final step and declaring that Palmer should no longer be
followed.
Assuming that the Seventh Circuit's conclusion regarding Palmer
is generally followed, the consequences of Redding are extensive but
fairly easy to predict. Subchapter C contains detailed rules governing
the taxation of corporate distributions of property which are triggered
by the finding that rights to acquire corporate assets, such as the war-
rants involved in Redding, are "property. '3 9 In essence, Redding will
bring the taxation of rights distributions in line with distributions of
other types of property.4° Although this will cause some administrative
problems in that it will require the valuation of such rights at the time
they are granted, valuation problems are common in tax law and in this
case are an acceptable price to pay in order to achieve a consistent
treatment of corporate distributions under subchapter C.
4 1
39. In general, I.R.C. § 301 provides the general rule that distributions first, are includable in
income to the extent they constitute dividends; second, they constitute a return of capital to the
extent of the shareholder's basis in his stock; and finally, they are treated as a gain from the sale or
exchange of stock. Section 302 deals with the situations in which a distribution in redemption of
stock is treated as a capital gain, I.R.C. §§ 331-334 deal with distributions in liquidation of the
corporation, and I.R.C. §§ 354-358 provide special rules dealing with reorganizations. See gener-
all y B. BrITKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 7.20, 9.20, 11.03, 14.10 (4th ed. 1979 & 1981 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as Bittker &
Eustice].
40. See Gann, supra note 15, at 964.
41. The problem of valuation is, of course, present whenever property other than cash (or
publicly traded securities) is distributed. However, the valuation problem is particularly acute in
the case of rights and options, in that the value of such rights is dependent not only on the differ-
ence between the fair market value of the property involved and the exercise price, but also upon
the term during which the right can be exercised. Thus, a right to acquire property at the prop-
erty's fair market value may have an independent value if the exercise price will remain fixed
during a period in which the value of the property may appreciate. Section 83, which deals in part
with the grant of stock options to employees as compensation, provides that such options are
includible in income when granted only if the options have a readily ascertainable fair market
value. I.R.C. § 83(e)(3). The regulations take a very narrow approach to this problem, providing
in essence that a stock option generally has a readily ascertainable fair market value only if the
option itself is publicly traded. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b). This rule can work to the disadvantage of
employees, who may wish to have the value of an option included in their taxable income as
compensation when the option is granted, so that any future appreciation in value will constitute
capital gain. In fact, the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 directs the Service to
develop more flexible rules for valuing options, but no rules have yet been promulgated. See H.
Conf. Rep. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 438 (1976), reprinledin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4147.
In the case of options or rights granted to shareholders, there is no statutory equivalent to
I.R.C. § 83. However, the Fifth Circuit in Baumer v. United States, 580 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1978),
reached a similar result through use of the "open transaction" doctrine, under which no income is
realized on an otherwise taxable transaction so long as the amount of income to be derived from
the transaction is impossible to ascertain. Id at 885. A complete discussion of the open transac-
tion doctrine, and a proposed statutory solution for distributions of stock rights based on the
principles of I.R.C. § 83, is in Gann, supra note 15, at 958-60 & 974-84.
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Section 355
Ironically, one of the areas in which the treatment of rights is left
unclear is the area involved in Redding itself: tax-free spin-offs under
section 355. The basic problem with the Seventh Circuit's analysis of
section 355 arises from the order in which it treated the issues raised in
the case. The Tax Court, in an effort to avoid directly addressing the
validity of Palmer, assumed arguendo that the distribution of warrants
would be a taxable transaction if section 355 were not applicable and
proceeded directly to its analysis of section 355. The Seventh Circuit,
whether out of deference to a venerable Supreme Court decision or a
desire to deal with the issues in the order in which the Tax Court had
raised them, also dealt with the section 355 issue first. As a result, both
courts treated Palmer as relevant only to the issue of whether the issu-
ance of the warrants constituted a dividend. Neither recognized
Palmer as presenting the more fundamental issue of whether the issu-
ance of the warrants was a distribution of property, the basic event
which triggers most of the relevant operative provisions of subchapter
C. As a result, the Seventh Circuit approached section 355 with one of
its most fundamental terms left undefined.
Section 355 was added to the Code in 1954 in order to provide
uniform rules governing the tax-free division of a corporation or con-
trolled corporate group. Prior to 1954, in order to attain tax-free status
such divisions had to qualify under the reorganization provisions of the
Code, and a considerable body of case law dealing with the distinctions
between "spin-offs," "split-offs" and "split-ups" developed. 42  Under
42. The earliest reorganization provisions of the tax laws provided tax-free treatment for an
exchange of stock for stock of other corporations pursuant to a reorganization, merger or consoli-
dation of the corporation. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057
(1919). Under this provision, a parent corporation could transfer the subsidiary's stock to its
shareholders in exchange for a portion of their parent corporation stock (a "split-off") or could
transfer all of its assets to two or more subsidiaries and dissolve, with the shareholders receiving
the subsidiaries' stock in exchange for their parent corporation stock (a "split-up"). The Revenue
Act of 1924 added a new provision, § 203(c), allowing stock to be distributed tax-free pursuant to
a reorganization without the surrender of other stock in exchange, which gave rise to the "spin-
off". Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, § 203(c), 43 Stat. 253 (1924). In Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), a corporation transferred unneeded assets to a subsidiary and
spun the subsidiary off to its sole shareholder who, upon liquidating the spun-off corporation, was
able to obtain a distribution of corporate earnings at capital gain rates. Although the Supreme
Court, in one of the most famous cases in tax law, ruled that the spin-off was not a reorganization
because of the lack of a valid business purpose, Congress, while the case was still on appeal, acted
to eliminate the problem by deleting the provision allowing spin-offs entirely from the Revenue
Act of 1934 and succeeding acts. No comparable action was taken on split-offs and split-ups,
although they would appear to be equally subject to abuse. Spin-offs remained in limbo until the
Revenue Act of 1951 added § I 12(b)(l 1) to the 1939 Code, reinstating spin-offs unless either the
spun-off subsidiary or the parent was not intended to conduct an active business, or the spun-off
stock was used as a "device for the distribution of earnings and profits." Revenue Act of 1951,
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section 355, however, when a corporation "distributes to a shareholder,
with respect to its stock . . . solely stock or securities" 43 of an eighty
percent controlled subsidiary, 44 the shareholders recognize no income
on the distribution, provided that three ancillary requirements are met.
The requirements are: first, the transaction must not be used princi-
pally as a device for distribution of earnings and profits of one of the
corporations;45 second, the corporation whose stock is distributed must
have been engaged in an active trade or business for at least five
years;46 and third, the distributing corporation must either distribute all
of the stock and securities of the spun-off corporation which it owns or
an amount of stock constituting "control" under the eighty percent test
of section 368(C).
47
Any analysis of the use of stock warrants in a spin-off must take
place in the shadow of Baan-Gordon. Baan-Gordon arose out of the
decision of AT&T to divide Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company
("Pacific"), which provided telephone services for the west coast, into
two separate subsidiaries. Accordingly, AT&T caused Pacific to form a
new subsidiary, Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company ("North-
west"), to which it transferred all of the assets necessary to conduct the
Oregon, Washington and Idaho business, retaining the California busi-
ness.48 Pacific was then to distribute the Northwest stock to its share-
holders. Since AT&T owned ninety percent of the stock of Pacific, it
would also end up owning ninety percent of the stock of Northwest,
and Pacific and Northwest would become sister companies. The re-
maining ten percent of the stock was publicly held. However, as in the
Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 31.7(a), 65 Stat. 452 (1951). These safeguards were the forerunners of I.R.C.
§ 355. In addition to providing a uniform and comprehensive set of rules governing. split-offs,
split-ups and spin-offs, section 355 eliminated the requirement that the distribution or exchange be
pursuant to a corporate reorganization, so that pre-existing subsidiaries may be spun or split off
without going through the formality of transferring assets to them in order to make the transaction
technically a reorganization. However, if a new subsidiary is to be formed prior to the split- or
spin-off, the transfer of assets will generally qualify as a "divisive D reorganization." See note 48
43. I.R.C. § 355(a)(l)(A)(i). A distribution may also be made to a security holder in ex-
change for its securities. I.R.C. § 355(a)(l)(A)(ii).
44. "Control" is actually defined in I.R.C. § 368(c) as ownership of 80% of the combined
voting power of all voting stock and of 80% of the number of shares of each nonvoting class of
stock.
45. I.R.C. § 355(a)(l)(B).
46. Id. §§ 355(a)(1)(C), 355(b)(2)(B). See note 87 infra.
47. Id. § 368(a)(l)(D). See note 44 supra and text accompanying note 85 infra.
48. If the distribution to the shareholders had qualified as a spin-off, the transfer of assets
from Pacific to Northwest would therefore constitute a "divisive D reorganization"--that is, a
transfer of part of the assets of one corporation to another followed by a distribution under I.R.C.
§ 355 of the new corporation's stock. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D). See generally Bittker & Eustice, supra
note 39, 1 13.03.
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Redding transaction, AT&T decided to use the transaction to raise op-
erating capital. Accordingly, Pacific issued to its shareholders transfer-
able rights to subscribe to Northwest stock, rather than issuing the
Northwest stock directly. Prior to the transaction, the Service had is-
sued a private letter ruling stating that the distribution was not a tax-
free spin-off and that, under Palmer, shareholders would receive a divi-
dend when they exercised their rights. AT&T accepted this determina-
tion,49 but the minority shareholders contended that the transaction
was a tax-free spin-off and took the Commissioner to court.
The Tax Court saw no problem with the prior use of warrants in a
spin-off. The principal issue was whether a distribution by Pacific
upon exercise of a warrant held by a shareholder was a "distribution
with respect to its stock." The Tax Court cited Palmer for the proposi-
tion that the relevant "distribution" for tax purposes had not taken
place until the warrants were exercised and the Northwest stock issued.
Since Baan and Gordon were shareholders of Pacific,5 0 and the North-
west stock could have been distributed to them outright, the court saw
no reason why they should be taxed because they were required to ex-
ercise a warrant and make a payment in order to receive the
distribution.
5'
The Commissioner's appeal in Baan-Gordon was to both the Sec-
ond and the Ninth Circuits. The Second Circuit, in Commissioner v.
Gordon,52 agreed with the Tax Court's reasoning. The Ninth Circuit,
however, in Commissioner v. Baans53 saw considerable difference be-
tween an outright distribution of stock and the use of stock warrants.
Section 355 requires that stock be "distributed," and the court stated
that the term "distribution" in the context of subchapter C refers to a
transfer of property from a corporation to its shareholders without pay-
ment of consideration. The court acknowledged that Palmer had held
that the sale of portfolio stock to shareholders at less than its fair mar-
ket value could constitute a "distribution." However, it stated that such
a deemed distribution was different from the actual distribution re-
quired to trigger section 355,54 In addition, the court reasoned that the
49. The dividend was of no particular concern to AT&T management because it would be
received tax-free under the 100% exclusion for dividends paid between members of an affiliated
group provided by I.R.C. § 243.
50. 45 T.C. at 70.
51. A footnote in the opinion reveals that at some point in the case the Service had awakened
to the fact that Palmer might no longer be good law, but the Tax Court rejected this argument
without extended discussion. 45 T.C. at 91 n.7.
52. 382 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1967).
53. 382 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1967).
54. Id. at 492-93.
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basic premise of section 355, like that of the other reorganization provi-
sions of the Code, is that immediately after the transaction, the spun-off
corporation would be owned by the shareholders who owned the origi-
nal corporation, so that the transaction merely readjusted the form of
the shareholders' ownership of the two corporations.55 The use of war-
rants requiring payment of consideration, the court held, more closely
resembled a sale than a tax-free reorganization, particularly where the
warrants were transferable to non-shareholders.
56
Baan and Gordon converged again in the Supreme Court, which
affirmed the Ninth Circuit on an alternative ground.57 The distribution
of Northwest stock warrants had actually consisted of two distributions
separated by two years, and the Supreme Court held that the two distri-
butions could not be aggregated for purposes of meeting the eighty-
percent-control distribution requirement.58 Thus, the Supreme Court
held that the transaction was a taxable spin-off but did nothing to re-
solve the basic disagreement over the meaning of a "distribution with
respect to its stock" which had split the Second and Ninth Circuits.
This was the basic issue faced by the Seventh Circuit in Redding.
Moreover, the Court's cryptic footnote raising the issue of the contin-
ued validity of Palmer59 further confused the area.
Redding v. Commissioner
In Redding, it was originally stipulated that the three ancillary re-
quirements of section 355 had been met. Although the Service changed
its position on one of its stipulations, the principal issue remained
whether the water company's distribution of Shorewood stock to the
Reddings upon their exercise of previously distributed stock warrants
constituted a distribution "with respect to its stock . . . solely of stock
or securities."
'60
The Tax Court in Redding stuck to its belief that the prior issuance
of transferable warrants did not disqualify a spin-off under section
355.61 However, mindful of the mixed reviews its opinion in Baan-
Gordon had received on appeal, it sought to bolster its analysis. More-
over, in light of the growing doubt as to the status of Palmer, the court
55. Id. at 495.
56. Id.
57. 391 U.S. 83 (1968).
58. Id at 94-98. The Ninth Circuit had reached the same conclusion. See 382 F.2d at 496-
98.
59. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
60. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
61. Redding v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 597 (1979).
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could not simply assume, as it had done previously, that the issuance of
the warrants was a mere offer and not a taxable event. To deal with
these problems, the court assumed that both the issuance of the war-
rants and the transfer of stock upon the exercise were "distributions of
property," and invoked the step transaction doctrine to disregard the
issuance of warrants as "merely a procedural device to give Water
Company shareholders the opportunity to be included or excluded
from the Shorewood stock distribution by their own decision ....
Thus, their distribution was merely a brief transitory phase of the cor-
porate separation. '62 Accordingly, the court did not reach the issue of
whether the issuance of the warrants would have constituted a dividend
had it not been a mere procedural device.
63
The Tax Court's attempt to restate its Baan-Gordon decision in
step transaction terms dictated the shape of the Seventh Circuit's opin-
ion.64 The Seventh Circuit began its analysis with the assumption that
two distributions had taken place-a distribution of warrants and a
subsequent distribution of stock-and proceeded to address three is-
sues: first, whether the distribution of stock was disqualified because
the earlier distribution of warrants violated the "solely stock and secur-
ities" requirement; 65 second, whether the distribution of stock was dis-
qualified because it was made "with respect to" warrants rather than
water company stock;66 and third, whether the distribution of stock was
disqualified because less than eighty percent of the stock was distrib-
uted to shareholders. 67 All three of these issues presuppose that the
transfer of stock from the water company to its shareholders who exer-
cised their warrants was a distribution for purposes of section 355.
However, the rule that a distribution takes place upon the exercise of
warrants is a corollary of Palmer, which the court decided in the second
half of its opinion had been overruled.
It is true that Palmer has generally been interpreted as turning on
the definition of "property" rather than that of "distribution. ' 68 How-
ever, it is clear from the Palmer opinion that the Supreme Court re-
garded the term "distribution" as one having a specialized meaning in
62. Id. at 610-11.
63. Id. at 603 n.4.
64. Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913
(1981).
65. 630 F.2d at 1169-78. Warrants are not "stock or securities." Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(a).
See also Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 198 (1942). The "solely" issue
was also mentioned by the Ninth Circuit in Baan-Gordon. See 382 F.2d at 492.
66. 630 F.2d at 1178-80. See text accompanying notes 80-82 infra.
67. 630 F.2d at 1180-81. See text accompanying notes 84-85 infra.
68. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 15, at 150.
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the corporate context. The basis for the Court's conclusion that the
issuance of rights did not constitute a dividend was that no "distribu-
tion of corporate assets" took place upon the issuance. Accordingly,
the Palmer Court characterized the rights as "at most options or contin-
uing offers," and noted that "distribution of the corporate property
could take place only on their exercise."
69
The fact that Palmer established that only the exercise of rights
could constitute a distribution does not necessarily mean that the over-
ruling of Palmer implies that only the issuance of rights may constitute
a distribution. It is possible that both the issuance and exercise of
rights can constitute distributions, which is what the Seventh Circuit
apparently assumed. However, such a conclusion would be at odds
with the detailed scheme of subchapter C, the enactment of which was
the ultimate basis for the conclusion that Palmer was obsolete.
Throughout subchapter C, the term distribution is used in the context
of a transfer from a corporation to its shareholders or security holders
in relation to their rights as participants in the corporation's capital.
Thus, the term is used to refer to 1) a transfer to the shareholder for no
consideration, in which case it is a dividend to the extent of the corpo-
ration's earnings and profits; 70 2) a transfer in consideration for the sur-
render of the shareholder's stock, in which case it may, under the
proper circumstances, be either a redemption or a liquidation;7' and
3) an exchange for certain other stocks and securities in some of the
reorganization provisions.72 The term is never used for a transfer from
the corporation to the shareholder in exchange for the payment of con-
sideration in cash or other property. Such transfers are treated simply
as sales.
The difficulty with a sale between a corporation and its sharehold-
ers is always that the sale may contain an element of a distribution to
the extent that the sale is for less than the value of the property. When
the sale is made outright without the intervention of the issuance of
rights, the regulations provide that, although the transfer of the prop-
erty pursuant to the sale is not a distribution, the excess of the value of
the property over the consideration paid is treated as a distribution.
73
When there is an issuance of rights, the Supreme Court's conclusion in
Palmer that a distribution could not take place until the rights were
69. 302 U.S. at 71. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
70. I.R.C. § 301. See generally Bittker & Eustice, supra note 39, 7.2.
71. I.R.C. §§ 302, 331. See generally Bittker & Eustice, supra note 39, 4.08, 11.01.
72. I.R.C. §§ 354, 356. See generally Bittker & Eustice, supra note 39, 14.01.
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-16. See Gann, supra note 15, at 937-39.
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exercised led to numerous difficulties in determining the amount, the
nature and timing of the distribution. 74 The abandonment of Palmer
clears the way for determining that the distribution in such a transac-
tion takes place at the moment the rights are issued, and any further
transactions regarding the rights, whether by an exercise, sale or lapse,
contain no distributive element..
The result of the failure by the Seventh Circuit to address the issue
of whether the transfer of water company stock constituted a distribu-
tion is apparent if one reviews the court's reasoning with a view to-
wards deriving general rules applicable to other types of spin-offs,
utilizing nontransferable stock warrants. Under the Seventh Circuit's
Redding analysis, the first question would be whether the step transac-
tion doctrine could be used to disregard the initial distribution of stock
warrants. The court in Redding reviewed separately each of the three
tests which have been developed in applying the step transaction
doctrine.
First, the court concluded that the issuance of stock warrants did
not satisfy the "end result" test. The warrants, the court said, had not
been inserted into the transaction for the purpose of furthering the end
result of distribution of the Shorewood stock to water company share-
holders. Rather, the warrants served the purpose of enabling the water
company to raise new capital, which was a separate and "somewhat
inconsistent" objective from the spin-off of Shorewood. 75 The transfer-
ability of the warrants aided this objective by permitting water com-
pany shareholders to sell their rights to persons willing to purchase the
Shorewood stock.
Second, the issuance of the warrants was held to fail the "interde-
pendence" test. While the exercise of the warrants by water company
shareholders was dependent upon the warrants having been issued, the
issuance of the warrants was not dependent upon their exercise by
shareholders. The court noted that water company would have
divested itself of Shorewood stock and raised the capital required even
if all of the warrants had been sold to third parties.
76
Finally, the Seventh Circuit found that the "binding commitment"
test had not been met because it was conceded that the water company
74. See Gann, supra note 15, at 937-39.
75. 630 F.2d at 1175-77. The "end result" test focuses on whether steps in a transaction were
taken "in furtherance of' an overall plan. Id. See, e.g., Kuper v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 152,
155-56 (5th Cir. 1976).
76. 630 F.2d at 1177-78. The "interdependence" test focuses on whether one step in a series
would be purposeless without completion of the series. See, e.g., King Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
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was bound to distribute the Shorewood stock not merely to sharehold-
ers, but to anyone who held a warrant. 77 Nevertheless, the Seventh
Circuit made a contribution to the interpretation of the binding com-
mitment test by declining to consider it as dispositive, despite language
in the Supreme Court's Gordon opinion which could be read to require
a binding commitment as a prerequisite to any application of the step
transaction doctrine.
78
Thus, the Seventh Circuit's analysis of all three step transaction
tests hinged in large part upon the transferability of the warrants, and it
may be inferred that the Seventh Circuit would apply the step transac-
tion rule to find that a spin-off employing nontransferable warrants
could qualify under section 355. However, if the overruling of Palmer
means that the exercise of the warrants do not constitute a distribution
at all, the transferability of the warrants would be irrelevant.
This distinction is more than a technicality. It reflects a funda-
mental difference between a spin-off in the form of a direct distribution
of stock, merely involving a reorganization of the ownership of the cor-
porate group, and a spin-off in the form of a sale of the stock of the
spun-off corporation to the shareholders of the original corporation,
which involves a realization by the distributing corporation of a portion
of the value of its assets. Although there may be a distributive element
in the latter transaction, what is "distributed" is not ownership of the
spun-off corporation, but the excess of the value of the spun-off corpo-
ration over the amount which is realized by the distributing corpora-
tion. The implication is that spin-offs which involve the use of
warrants requiring the payment of consideration for the receipt of the
spun-off corporation's stock, whether such warrants are transferable or
not, cannot qualify under section 355 because the fundamental element
of a distribution of stock is missing.
Although what is "distributed" in a spin-off utilizing warrants is
technically the excess in value of the spun-off corporation's stock over
the exercise price, rather than the stock itself, the result of the transac-
tion is that shareholders of the distributing corporation wind up di-
rectly owning both the distributing corporation and the spun-off
corporation, subject to the possibility that they may have sold their
77. 630 F.2d at 1178.
78. Id. As discussed previously, there were two separate distributions of warrants in Baan-
Gordon, and the Supreme Court held that the two could not be aggregated because at the time of
the first distribution there was no "binding commitment" to make the second distribution. 391
U.S. at 96. The Seventh Circuit interpreted the binding commitment test as applying primarily to
situations in which the "steps" occur in separate taxable years. 630 F.2d at 1178.
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rights to receive the spun-off corporation's stock. A court inclined to
take this view could apply the Tax Court's step transaction theory in
reverse, holding that the transfer of stock should be treated as a part of
the initial distribution. Such an approach, however, would put a con-
siderable strain on the language of section 355.79
Nevertheless, assuming that some version of the step transaction
theory can be used to satisfy the distribution of stock requirement,
there remain the Seventh Circuit's two alternative grounds for decision
in Redding. First, the court held that the Shorewood stock had not
been distributed "with respect to" the water company stock, as required
by section 355(a)(1)(A), because the stock had been distributed to any-
one who held a warrant, whether they were water company sharehold-
ers or third party purchasers.8 0 This conclusion rests on a somewhat
strained reading of the statute. The operative language of section 355
provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized by a shareholder who
receives a distribution with respect to his stock, providing that the other
requirements of the section are met. The Reddings clearly were water
company shareholders who received Shorewood stock with respect to
their water company stock holdings. The Seventh Circuit essentially
concluded that because water company shareholders were given the op-
portunity to transfer their warrants, and some shareholders other than
the Reddings did so, the distribution of Shorewood stock to the Red-
dings was not with respect to their stock. This reading seems contrary
to the focus of section 355 which is on the individual shareholder who
receives the stock.
It is, of course, common in corporate reorganizations that an indi-
vidual shareholder may receive nothing in the course of the reorganiza-
tion other than stock in other corporations involved in the
reorganization, but that the transaction viewed as a whole may consti-
tute a sale, so that all shareholders are denied nonrecognition treat-
ment. To deal with this situation, courts developed the "continuity of
interest" doctrine, which generally provides that no transaction will be
treated as a tax-free reorganization unless shareholders in the original
corporations involved in the transaction wind up owning a substantial
equity interest in the resulting corporations.8'
79. The Supreme Court, in Gordon, stated that "the requirements of [I.R.C. § 355] are de-
tailed and specific, and must be applied with precision." 391 U.S. at 91-92. Thus, any attempt to
stretch I.R.C. § 355 to apply to transactions within its spirit but not its letter is of dubious validity.
See note 87 infra.
80. 630 F.2d at 1178-80.
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b). The 50% test is a rule of thumb based on the Service ruling
standards. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. The legislative history of I.R.C. § 355 indicates that
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The Tax Court in Redding attempted to apply this theory, by hold-
ing that the distribution of Shorewood stock had been with respect to
the water company stock because water company shareholders ended
up owning more than fifty percent of the Shorewood stock.82 The Sev-
enth Circuit, however, rejected this argument, stating merely: "We
know of no authority that mere satisfaction of the 50 percent standard
is enough to meet the section 355(a)(1)(A) problem. ' 83 It is not surpris-
ing that the court knew of no such authority as it had essentially cre-
ated the "section 355(a)(1)(A) problem" by its conclusion that the
determination of whether a distribution to a shareholder was "with re-
spect to his stock" turns upon whether other shareholders had sold
their rights to receive the stock.
The court's conclusion was that the Shorewood transaction failed
to satisfy the distribution of control requirement of section 355(a)(1)(D)
because even though the water company divested itself of eighty per-
cent of the Shorewood stock, not all of it was distributed to water com-
pany shareholders.84 Once again, the Seventh Circuit's conclusion
appears to be based on a somewhat strained reading of the statute.
Section 355(a)(1)(D) only requires that eighty percent of the distribut-
ing corporation's stock be distributed, not that it be distributed "to
shareholders." Moreover, the actual terms of the section 355(a)(1)(D)
require that the distributing corporation must either distribute all of its
stock and securities, or must both distribute an amount constituting
control of the spun-off corporation and demonstrate to the satisfaction
of the Service that its retention of the remaining stock and securities is
not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the
avoidance of federal income tax. It would thus seem clear that the fo-
Congress intended that the objective tests set forth therein would supplant the need for such judi-
cial doctrines. See H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 236-37 (1954), reprintedin [1954] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4253-54.
82. The Tax Court's discussion of the "in respect to" issue is not entirely clear. At one point,
it cited Rev. Rul. 68-21, 1968-1 C.B. 104, for the proposition that the distribution upon exercise by
a shareholder of his warrant is with respect to his stock regardless of how many other shareholders
sell their warrants. 71 T.C. at 611. However, it seemed to qualify this statement by noting that
since continuity of interest existed, there was no abuse of I.R.C. § 355. Id. at 610-11. The Seventh
Circuit interpreted this to mean that a spin-off employing warrants might not be considered "in
respect to" stock if a majority of the shareholders sold their warrants, breaking the continuity of
interest.
83. 630 F.2d at 1180.
84. Id The water company distributed almost 80% of its Shorewood stock, but 50,000 shares
went to underwriters rather than shareholders, and an additional unknown number went to pur-
chasers of warrants. The Service had originally stipulated that I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(D) was satisfied.
However, the Tax Court treated the question of whether I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(D) required distribu-
tions to shareholders as a pure issue of law which could be raised on brief notwithstanding the
stipulation. 71 T.C. at 605.
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cus of section 355(a)(1)(D) is upon requiring the distributing corpora-
tion to completely divest itself of stock and securities in the spun-off
corporation, rather than upon the recipients of the stock and
securities.
85
As in its analysis of the step transaction issue, the court's conclu-
sions on the latter two issues would appear to permit the use of non-
transferable warrants in a spin-off transaction. Transferable warrants,
on the other hand, would seem to be effectively precluded by the Sev-
enth Circuit's approach, since if even a single shareholder transferred
his warrant, the "with respect to" requirement would be violated, and,
moreover, it would then be necessary for the distributing corporation to
demonstrate that it had succeeded in distributing eighty percent control
of the spun-off corporation to shareholders. These conclusions are ob-
jectionable on two grounds. On the one hand, the court's analysis on
both points was based upon the fundamental assumption that the trans-
fer of stock on exercise of the warrant was a distribution. It thus per-
petuates the same basic error in the court's reasoning which
characterized its approach to the step transaction issue and which may
mislead taxpayers into believing that nontransferable warrants may be
used in spin-off transactions. On the other hand, if, as discussed above,
the distribution problem can be overcome, then the court's conclusion
that the use of transferable warrants is always completely proscribed
appears to be overly restrictive. The court seems to have assumed that
it was necessary for it to give a restrictive reading to sections
355(a)(1)(A) and 355(a)(1)(D) in order to prevent abuses of the spin-off
provisions. However, section 355 already contains adequate safeguards
against such abuses which do not require such a strained reading of the
statutory language.
It is well-established that the principal danger in spin-off transac-
tions is that a corporation may transfer a portion of its accumulated
earnings to a subsidiary and spin the subsidiary off to its shareholders,
allowing them, through sale or redemption of their stock in the subsidi-
ary, to recognize income as capital gain which should be taxed as divi-
dends8 6 To prevent such transactions, section 355(a)(1)(B) specifically
provides that a spin-off will not be eligible for tax-free treatment if it is
85. There is no explicit explanation for the requirements of section 355(a)(l)(D) in the legis-
lative history of I.R.C. § 355. It may be based on a provision in the regulations under § I 12(b)(l 1)
of the 1939 Code, which provided that bona fide business reasons for a spin-off would ordinarily
require that all of the stock be distributed in order to effect a complete corporate separation.
Partial distributions were considered more likely to be for the purpose of distributing earnings.
Treas. Reg. § 39.112(b)(ll)-2(c). See note 42 supra.
86. See note 42 supra.
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used principally as a device for the distribution of earnings of one of
the corporations involved. Moreover, section 355(a)(1)(C) requires that
the spun-off subsidiary be engaged in a separate trade or business
which has been actively conducted for at least five years. This require-
ment parallels the separate business requirement in the partial liquida-
tion area, so that a corporation cannot indirectly accomplish through a
spin-off what it cannot directly accomplish through a partial liquida-
tion. 87 In Redding, it was stipulated that both sections 355(a)(1)(B) and
355(a)(1)(C) were satisfied. It would appear, therefore, that the under-
lying purposes of section 355 were not violated by the transaction, and
that there was no need for the Seventh Circuit to warp the meaning of
sections 355(a)(1)(A) and 355(a)(1)(D) in order to guard against a non-
existent abuse.
88
In summary, the results of Redding can only be described as
mixed. By abandoning Palmer, the Seventh Circuit has paved the way
for a more rational and consistent treatment of distribution of rights to
acquire corporate property. However, the court failed to follow
through on its conclusion concerning Palmer in construing section 355.
As a result, its approach to the use of warrants in spin-offs appears to
be somewhere between the liberal substance over form approach of the
87. Under I.R.C. § 331(a)(2), a distribution in partial liquidation of a corporation may pro-
duce a capital gain. I.R.C. § 346(b) provides a safe harbor definition for partial liquidation if the
liquidation is due to the corporation's ceasing to conduct a trade or business which has been
actively conducted for five years, and if the corporation continues after the distribution to conduct
another active trade or business which it has conducted for five years. The same basic two-busi-
ness five-year rule is applied under I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(C). See I.R.C. § 355(b). Thus, in most
cases assets which could be spun off in order to bail out corporate earnings in a transaction such as
that involved in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), see note 42 supra, could be distributed
directly in a partial liquidation. For a full discussion of the intricacies of I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(C), see
Bittker & Eustice, supra note 39, 13.04, 13.05.
88. See note 81 supra for indications in the legislative history that Congress intended the
provisions of I.R.C. § 355 to be adequate safeguards against abuse of spin-offs. I.R.C.
§ 355(a)(1)(B) specifically provides that sales of spun-off stock by shareholders following the
transaction shall not be considered evidence that the spin-off is a device for distribution of earn-
ings, unless such sales are negotiated or agreed upon prior to the distribution. The Seventh Cir-
cuit noted in a footnote that a sale of a shareholder's warrant could be considered a sale of his
stock arranged prior to the distribution. 630 F.2d at 1180 n.22. Moreover, the court stated that
any such sale might cause a distribution to be presumed to be a "device," and seemed to indicate
that the sale of 50% or more of the warrants would be conclusive. Id. This theory provides a
further obstacle to the use of transferrable warrants in a spin-off.
The distinction between transferable and nontransferable warrants may be one more of sub-
stance than form, however, at least in the case of publicly traded corporations. In such a corpora-
tion, there will always be an interval between the time a distribution of portfolio stock is
announced and the time it occurs, and in that interval, if demand is sufficient, the stock to be
distributed will trade on a when-issued basis. The Seventh Circuit declined to express an opinion
as to whether when-issued trading was the equivalent of the use of transferable warrants, 630 F.2d
at 1176 n. 16, but the Service has already indicated that it considers them equivalent. Rev. Rul. 80-
292, 1980-2 C.B. 104.
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Tax Court and the Second Circuit in Baan, and the strict construction-
ist approach of the Ninth Circuit in Gordon. Corporations seeking an
answer as to the outer limits of the permissible use of such warrants
will find little useful guidance in Redding.
DEDUCTIBILITY OF JOINT VENTURE START-UP EXPENSES
Madison Gas & Electric Co. v. Commissioner 9 provides an interest-
ing example of the way in which litigation strategies can effect the de-
velopment of the tax laws. The issue in Madison Gas was whether
certain expenditures incurred in connection with the formation of a
joint venture constituted deductible business expenses or had to be cap-
italized. The Service elected to stipulate the factual issue in the case,
which it might very well have won, in the hopes of obtaining aper se
rule of law which could be applied in other partnership cases, and its
strategy paid off.90 The taxpayer, on the other hand, apparently de-
cided for tactical reasons not to raise an argument which could have
provided it with an escape hatch from the capitalization requirement.
As a result, Madison Gas is an incomplete case: it gives notice to tax-
payers contemplating expanding their business through a joint venture
that certain expenses incurred may be nondeductible even though they
would have been deductible had the taxpayer incurred them individu-
ally, but it does not resolve the question of whether it is possible to
avoid this result.
Madison Gas is a public utility operating in Wisconsin, engaged in
the generation and distribution of electricity and in the purchase and
distribution of natural gas. In order to meet a growing demand for
electricity, Madison Gas decided to enter into a joint venture with two
other Wisconsin utilities to construct and operate a nuclear power gen-
erating plant. Under the terms of the agreement the three utilities were
to own the plant as tenants in common, would be responsible for all
expenses of the plant and would be entitled to use the output of the
plant, all in proportion to their "Ownership Share." Prior to the time
the plant began operation, the three utilities incurred expenses for the
training and relocating of the personnel to be used to operate the
89. 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980), qfl'g 72 T.C. 521 (1979).
90. Madison Gas is already being cited as standing for the proposition that a partnership's
start-up expenses are nondeductible. See In re Boyd, 76 T.C. 646 (1981); Goodwin v. Commis-
sioner, 75 T.C. 424 (1980). In cases involving tax shelters, which are usually organized as limited
partnerships with disproportionately large expenses in early years, the Madison Gas holding will
be useful to the Service.
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plant. 91 Madison Gas deducted its share of these expenditures as "or-
dinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred. . in carrying on any
trade or business" under section 162, and the Service, citing Richmond
Television Corp. v. United States,92 disallowed the deduction.
In Richmond Television, a corporation formed for the purpose of
operating a television station incurred training and personnel expenses
prior to the time it was granted a license and authorized to begin
broadcasting. Although personnel expenses are ordinarily deductible,
the Fourth Circuit held that such expenses were incurred in acquiring a
trade or business rather than in carrying one on, and were therefore
capital expenditures under section 263.
The Service in Madison Gas stipulated that the expenses involved
would have been deductible notwithstanding Richmond Television had
Madison Gas constructed the nuclear power plant itself, because they
were incurred in the course of Madison Gas' ongoing business of sell-
ing electricity. This stipulation represents a surprisingly narrow inter-
pretation of Richmond Television for the Service, and it is questionable
whether the Service would take the same position in a case which did
not involve a partnership.
93
In Madison Gas itself, the stipulation served its purpose of focus-
ing the court's attention on the Service's main argument that the ex-
penditures were capital because they had been made by a partnership,
and the partnership had not yet begun carrying on a trade or business.
Thus, the issues in the case became whether the joint venture was a
partnership for tax purposes and, if so, whether it was the business of
the partnership or that of the individual partners which was relevant in
91. The expenses included fees for various training and orientation courses, salaries and re-
imbursed travel expenses for the personnel undergoing training; gas, oil and maintenance ex-
penses for vehicles used in the training; preparation of manuals, outlines and similar materials;
and related overhead costs. 72 T.C. at 541-42.
92. 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965), on
remand, 354 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965).
93. The Service's stipulation was purportedly based upon the theory that Richmond Televi-
sion applies only to expenses incurred in connection with a new business. See 72 T.C. at 557-58.
However, in NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1981), the Fourth Circuit itself
rejected this reading of Richmond Television in holding that expenditures incurred by a bank in
planning the opening of new branches were capital. The test, the court said, is not whether the
expenditure is incurred in a new business or an old business, but whether it is incurred in order to
produce future income, so that a proper matching of revenues and expenditures requires that it be
capitalized and amortized. Id. at 955-56. However, the Service has issued two letter rulings which
appear inconsistent with NCNB: Private Letter Rulings 8135031 (May 29, 1981) & 8141033 (June
30, 1981). Also, the Fourth Circuit has granted rehearing en banc on NCNB, so it would appear
that the question of whether there is an "old business" exception to Richmond Television is still
open. In Madison Gas, the Tax Court expressed reservations about the stipulation, but accepted it
for purposes of the case, 72 T.C. at 558, as did the Seventh Circuit. 633 F.2d at 514 n.l.
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determining whether the personnel training and relocation costs should
be expensed or capitalized.
Madison Gas' argument that its joint venture was not a partner-
ship for tax purposes was quickly and correctly disposed of by the Sev-
enth Circuit. A partnership for tax purposes is not limited to an entity
which is a partnership under state law, but includes any "syndicate,
group, pool, joint venture or other unincorporated organization
through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or ven-
ture is carried on." 94 Despite the apparent breadth of this definition,
the regulations provide that the mere co-ownership of property does
not constitute a partnership, although co-owners may be considered to
be partners if they "actively carry on trade, business, financial opera-
tion, or venture and divide the profits thereof."95 Madison Gas' con-
tention was that since the joint venture did not market electricity and
distribute the profits, but merely distributed the electricity itself, it was
not engaged in carrying on a trade, business, financial operation or
venture within the meaning of the regulations.
96
This argument, however, foundered on the strength of Bentex Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner.97 There, the Tax Court had held that under the
definition of a partnership contained in the 1939 Code,98 an organiza-
tion formed to extract oil and distribute the oil in kind for sale by its
members was a partnership. The 1939 Code definition of a partnership
was incorporated without change in the 1954 Code.99 Congress also
provided in section 761(a) for the issuance of regulations allowing a
partnership to elect not to be treated as a partnership for purposes of
subchapter K of the Code if, inter alia, "it is availed of for the joint
production, extraction, or use of property, but not for the purpose of
selling services or property produced or extracted."100 The Seventh
94. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2). The same language is found in I.R.C. § 761(a), which defines "part-
nership" for purposes of subchapter K of the Code.
95. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.761-1(a), 301.7701-3(a).
96. Madison Gas also argued that its joint venture was a "mere undertaking to share ex-
penses," which is also considered not to be a partnership under the regulations. Id. However, the
example of such an undertaking given in the regulations is that of adjoining property owners who
share the expense of a drainage ditch, and the Seventh Circuit felt that the operation of a nuclear
power plant involved a higher level of business activity than the digging of a ditch. 633 F.2d at
517 n.5.
97. 20 T.C. 565 (1953).
98. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 3797(a)(2), 53 Stat. 469 (repealed 1954).
99. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 353 (1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4025, 4378; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 428-29 (1954), reprinted in [1954]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 5049-50. The committee reports, however, do not explicitly
refer to Bentex.
100. This election is discussed in the text at note 116 infra.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
Circuit confirmed the general opinion of the commentators by holding
explicitly that section 761(a) had in essence codified the Tax Court's
ruling in Bentex that such an organization was a partnership, while
allowing Bentex-type organizations to elect out of the more burden-
some partnership reporting and accounting requirements.10' The fact
that the organization distributed its profits in kind rather than engaging
in sales activities, the court said, was irrelevant. 0 2
Having thus concluded that the joint venture was a partnership for
tax purposes, the Seventh Circuit then turned to the question of
whether it was the partnership's prior business or that of Madison Gas
which should be looked to in determining whether the personnel train-
ing and relocation costs should be expensed or capitalized. On this
point, the court's opinion is regretably cryptic. The court characterized
the issue as whether the partnership should be disregarded as lacking
economic substance, and seemed to imply that, unless the partnership
lacked economic substance, it would be compelled to hold that the ex-
penditures were nondeductible under section 263.103 However, there is
nothing in section 263 which specifically provides that partnership
start-up expenses are always capital items. Section 263 merely provides
that capital expenditures are not deductible. It has generally been left
to the Service and the courts to determine on a case-by-case basis what
expenditures are properly charged to the capital account. 1°4  There
would have been nothing to preclude the Seventh Circuit from con-
cluding that a partner's share of the start-up expenses of a partnership
should be considered deductible expenses if the formation of the part-
101. 633 F.2d at 515-16. See, e.g., Taubman, Oil and Gas Parnershiops and Section 761(a), 12
TAx. L. REV. 49, 67 (1956).
102. The Seventh Circuit's reasoning went somewhat beyond the Service's argument, and may
have unintended consequences. The Service's general position is that a distribution in kind of
produced or extracted materials is not a division of profits. It has followed this position in holding
that unincorporated organizations which distribute products in kind cannot be associations taxa-
ble as corporations under I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) because they lack a profit motive, even if they pos-
sess the four "corporate characteristics" of centralized management, continuity of life, free
transferability of interests and limited liability. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a). See I.T. 3948, 1949-1
C.B. 161; I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. 126; Private Letter Ruling 7826096 (March 31, 1978). In the
partnership context, the Service's position is that a joint profit motive is merely one characteristic
of a partnership, and that the lack of such a motive may be compensated for by a sufficient level of
business activity. This is the argument the Service actually made in Madison Gas. See 633 F.2d at
516 n.3. It remains to be seen whether the Seventh Circuit's holding that a distribution in kind
constitutes a profit sharing relationship will affect the Service's position on the tax classification of
unincorporated associations. Contra, Allison v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1055 (1976).
103. 633 F.2d at 517.
104. See Bittker & Eustice, supra note 39, 5.04. There are, however, a number of situations
in which the Code provides specific rules regarding the capitalization or deductibility of expenses.
Several of these are contained in paragraphs (b) through (g) of I.R.C. § 263 itself. See also I.R.C.
§§ 174, 175, 177, 178, 266, 278.
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nership is essentially an extension of the partner's preexisting trade or
business. 1
05
There is one statement in the Seventh Circuit's opinion which can
be construed as a policy justification for its conclusion that partnership
start-up expenses are always capital, regardless of the partner's trade or
business. Madison Gas cited in support of its position a series of cases
which have held that the costs incurred by banks in setting up or join-
ing associations which act as clearing houses for bank credit card sys-
tems were deductible as business expenses. 106 The court noted that in
those cases the bank's participation in the credit card system had not
created any separate assets or property interest.10 7 It is not clear, how-
ever, what "asset" the Seventh Circuit felt was created by Madison
Gas' share of start-up expenses. The asset cannot have been Madison
Gas' ownership interest in the nuclear plant itself, since if that were the
case, the expenses would not have been deductible even if incurred by
Madison Gas individually, contrary to the Service's stipulation. If the
Seventh Circuit meant that the asset created was the going concern
value of the joint venture's activity, its reasoning was circular in that
the basic issue raised was whether the joint venture's activity was a
separate trade or business or a mere continuation of the business of the
three utilities.'0 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit's statement makes
sense only if the asset to which it referred was Madison Gas' partner-
ship interest in the partnership created by the joint venture agree-
ment. 1°9 This conclusion highlights the main issue that was raised, but
not resolved, by the case.
105. See note 118 infra.
106. First Nat'l Bank of South Carolina v. United States, 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1977); Colo-
rado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974); First Sec. Bank of Idaho
v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 644 (1975).
107. 633 F.2d at 517. The court also noted that no suggestion was made in the credit card
cases that the organizations administering the credit card clearing systems constituted partnerships
under I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3). However, the conclusion reached in the credit card cases has been
questioned. See NCNB v. United States, 651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1981). See also note 93 supra.
The question of whether an expenditure must create or enhance an asset of some kind in order to
be capitalized was raised by dicta in Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345
(1971), and has divided the circuits. Compare NCNB v. United States, 651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir.
1981), with Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
108. Going concern value is an intangible asset reflecting the increased value of a business'
assets caused by the fact that they are organized as an operating enterprise. It is similar to, but
distinct from, goodwill. Of course, the expenditures could be considered to have enhanced
Madison Gas' own going concern value but this again would contradict the stipulation that the
expenditures would have been deductible if incurred directly.
109. This conclusion in itself raises a problem, in that, as discussed at notes 116-17 infra, the
joint venture had elected not to be subject to subchapter K, and therefore the provisions of sub-
chapter K providing for a partnership interest to be a separate asset with a distinct basis were not
applicable. See note 115 infra.
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As discussed above, section 761(a) allows an unincorporated asso-
ciation, such as the joint venture involved in Madison Gas, to elect not
to be treated as a partnership for purposes of subchapter K of the Code.
In fact, the joint venture had made this election, but Madison Gas did
not raise the argument that the making of the election should exempt
the joint venture's start-up expenditures from the Richmond Television
rule, apparently because it was afraid that the making of the election
would be construed as an admission that the joint venture was a part-
nership. If this was its reasoning, the tactic backfired. The Service
made the contention that the making of the election constituted an ad-
mission anyway, and the Tax Court rejected it.10 The Tax Court,
however, went on to note that it might have been receptive to an argu-
ment that the section 761(a) election should cause the expenditures to
be deductible had Madison Gas chosen to make the argument."I
Madison Gas then belatedly sought to raise the issue on appeal. The
Seventh Circuit declined to consider the question because it had not
been raised in the Tax Court, but noted in a footnote that it was ques-
tionable whether a section 761(a) election should affect the deductibil-
ity of the expenses, in that the election applies only to subchapter K. 112
Section 263, which precludes the deduction of capital expenditures, is
contained in subchapter B.
It is unfortunate that Madison Gas chose not to raise this argu-
ment, and doubly unfortunate that the Seventh Circuit chose to com-
ment on the issue without examining it carefully. If the Seventh
Circuit's footnote is an indication that the court's inclination is to rule
that a section 761(a) election is irrelevant to the Richmond Television
issue, it is wrong.
The mere fact that section 263 is not included in subchapter K
does not mean that a section 761 (a) election is irrelevant to the deduct-
ibility of a partnership's start-up expenses. As discussed above, section
263 merely states the general rule that capital expenditures are not de-
ductible; it does not specify that a partnership's start-up expenses must
always be considered capital expenditures. That issue is left for the
Service and courts to resolve on a case-by-case basis. Notwithstanding
the above criticism of the Seventh Circuit's cursory treatment of the
question of whose trade or business is relevant for determining the ap-
plicability of Richmond Television to a partnership's start-up expenses,
110. 72 T.C. at 558.
111. Id. at 559 n.9.
112. 633 F.2d at 515 n.2.
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there are a number of policy reasons for treating a newly formed part-
nership as always being engaged in a new trade or business regardless
of the trade or business of its partners. However, these policy reasons
are applicable only if the partnership is treated as a partnership for
purposes of subchapter K.
Although a partnership pays no taxes and its income and expenses
flow through directly to its partners,' 13 it is generally treated as a sepa-
rate entity under subchapter K. Generally, it is to the partnership, and
not to the individual partners, that the tax law looks to determine the
nature of the business in which items of partnership income and ex-
pense are earned or incurred.1 4 Moreover, a partnership interest is
considered a separate asset from a partner's ownership share in the
partnership's individual assets, so that a partner who sells his partner-
ship interest is generally treated as selling a single asset rather that an
undivided interest in all of the partnership's properties."15
In these circumstances, it makes sense to treat a partnership as be-
ing engaged in a separate trade or business which is subject to the Rich-
mond Television rule requiring the capitalization of start-up expenses.
However, when a partnership is permitted to elect out of subchapter K
under section 761(a), the partnership is generally disregarded as a sepa-
rate entity, and each partner is treated as individually owning his share
of the partnership's assets. However, the availability of the section
761(a) election is limited. As discussed above, one of the types of part-
nerships which is eligible for the election is the type that was formed by
Madison Gas: one which is engaged merely in the production of prop-
erty but not in the complete business activity of producing and market-
ing it.116 Moreover, section 761(a) specifies that the election is
available only if the income of the partners "may be adequately deter-
113. I.R.C. §§ 701, 702.
114. Thus, if the partnership is engaged in a trade or business, its expenses and losses are
deductible by the partners as though they were engaged in the trade or business, even though they
may be mere passive investors in the partnership. See Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(b). The Tax Court
discussed this issue in more detail in Goodwin v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424 (1981), in which it
declined to contravene Madison Gas. For a complete discussion of the difference between the
"aggregate" and "entity" theories of partnership taxation, see I W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R.
WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 1.02 (1977).
115. I.R.C. § 741. However, I.R.C. § 751 contains special rules designed to prevent the con-
version of ordinary income into capital gain through the sale of a partnership interest, analogous
in purpose though not in operation to the collapsible corporation rules of I.R.C. § 341.
116. I.R.C. § 761(a)(2). See note 100 supra. The other class of partnership eligible for a
I.R.C. § 761(a) election are those formed solely for investment. I.R.C. § 761(a)(1). In 1978, tem-
porary organizations of securities dealers formed for underwriting purposes were added as I.R.C.
§ 7 6 1(a)(3), but as yet no regulations extending the election to such arrangements have been
promulgated.
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mined without the computation of partnership taxable income." Thus,
the basic premise of the section 761(a) election is that the partners
should not be considered as having formed a separate business entity,
but merely as having entered into a cooperative arrangement in the
furtherance of their own individual businesses. In such circumstances,
the argument of Madison Gas that its participation in the joint venture
should have been considered merely as an extension of its own trade or
business is highly compelling, although it is possible that even if the
partnership had been disregarded, the type of expenditures involved in
Madison Gas might have been considered capital but for the Service's
stipulation. '17
A further argument in favor of not applying Richmond Television
to start-up expenditures of a partnership which has been permitted to
elect out of subchapter K is found in section 709, which permits a part-
nership to amortize its organizational expenditures over not less than
sixty months.' 1 8 The deductibility of organizational expenditures as
defined in section 709 was not in issue in Madison Gas, but the forma-
tion of a joint venture such as that involved in the case would require
orgnizational expenses. Section 709 is contained in subchapter K and
accordingly would not be available to a partnership which had elected
out of subchapter K under section 761(a).1 9 Thus, if the Seventh Cir-
cuit, as implied by the footnote in Madison Gas, would hold that sec-
tion 761(a) has no effect on the deductibility of a partnership's start-up
expenses, presumably including organizational expenses, the result
would be that a partnership which is engaged in a separate business
and therefore ineligible to elect under section 761(a) could amortize its
117. See note 93 supra.
118. I.R.C. § 709(a) provides that organization and syndication expenses are not deductible,
and I.R.C. § 709(b) provides for the amortization of organization, but not syndication, expenses.
The purposes of I.R.C. § 709 were to eliminate any implication in I.R.C. § 707(c) that guaranteed
payments made to managing partners for organizing the partnership and selling partnership inter-
ests were currently deductible even though the partnership had not yet begun to do business, and
to provide a five-year amortization election for organizational expenses similar to that available
for corporations under I.R.C. § 248. The regulations under I.R.C. § 248, and those proposed
under I.R.C. § 709, require that the expenses amortized be those connected with forming the cor-
poration or partnership itself rather than starting its business. Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1(b)(2); Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.709-2(a), 45 Fed. Reg. 2349 (1980). This problem was resolved in the Miscellane-
ous Revenue Act of 1980 by the enactment of Code section 195, which provides a general five-year
amortization schedule for all start-up expenses incurred after July 29, 1980. Miscellaneous Reve-
nue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 102, 94 Stat. 3522 (1980). See H.R. Rep. No. 1278, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980); S. Rep. No. 1036, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7300.
119. I.R.C. § 761(a) does provide for a partnership to elect out of part but not all of subchapter
K, and presumably a partnership could request to be excluded from all subchapter K provisions
except for I.R.C. § 709. See Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(c). Whether the Service would honor such a
request is questionable.
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organizational expenses, whereas a partnership eligible for a section
761(a) election could neither deduct nor amortize its expenses. This
result seems contrary to Congress' intent in enacting section 709.
The Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the start-up expenditures of
a new partnership must be capitalized is a sensible one in the context of
a partnership subject to subchapter K. However, it is unfortunate that
the case in which the issue was raised involved a partnership which was
eligible to elect out of subchapter K. The result will be to unfairly
penalize existing businesses which wish to expand their operations, but
can only reasonably do so by entering into cooperative ventures with
other taxpayers in the same business. It is to be hoped that if in the
future another case arises involving the start-up expenditures of a joint
venture such as that entered into by Madison Gas, the courts will disre-
gard the Seventh Circuit's ill-conceived dictum and address the sub-
stantive issue of whether such expenditures are ordinary and necessary
business expenses under Richmond Television.
A LIBERALIZED RULE FOR INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNT
ELIGIBILITY
In Foulkes v. Commissioner, 20 the Seventh Circuit departed from
the rule of strict construction which the Service and the courts have
uniformly followed in resolving cases involving contributions to indi-
vidual retirement accounts ("IRA"). 21 A sensible result was reached
in Foulkes which is probably in accordance with Congress' purpose in
creating IRAs; in fact, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981122 elim-
inated the Foulkes issue entirely. However, the 1981 amendments will
be applied on a prospective basis only, and taxpayers who have already
fallen afoul of the complexities of the IRA provisions will have to look
to Foulkes for relief. Unfortunately, the extent of the relief afforded by
Foulkes is far from clear.
IRAs were created by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA").123 Their purpose is to extend the tax benefits
enjoyed by employees whose employers maintain retirement plans for
their benefit to employees whose employers are not so generous by al-
120. 638 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1981).
121. IRA's are defined by I.R.C. § 408(a).
122. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 311, 95 Stat. 277 (1981), reprinted in [1981] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 105 (Supp. 6).
123. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 401-415 & 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
lowing the latter employees to deduct contributions made to an IRA. 124
Notwithstanding their benevolent purpose, the IRA provisions have
produced a volume of litigation wholly disproportionate to the
amounts of revenue involved. The center of the controversy is section
219(b)(2)(A), which provides that a taxpayer may not deduct contribu-
tions made to an IRA in any year in which "for any part of such year
.. . he was an active participant" in a tax-qualified retirement plan. 125
This provision was necessary to implement Congress' intent to make
the benefits of IRAs available only to employees whose employers do
not maintain a retirement plan for their benefit. However, the term
"active participant" is not defined in section 219 and, as quickly be-
comes apparent upon an examination of the many cases involving the
issue,' 26 the term is misunderstood by a substantial number of
taxpayers.
The tone of the cases dealing with this issue was set by the Tax
Court in Orzechowski v. Commissioner. 27 Orzechowski was a partici-
pant in his employer's qualified pension plan in 1975, but, anticipating
124. Contributions made by an employer on behalf of an employee to a retirement plan qual-
ified under section 401(a) are deductible when made even though not includible in the employee's
income until distributed. I.R.C. §§ 402(a)(1), 404(a). The IRA provisions provide a comparable
tax benefit (i.e., retirement savings out of pre-tax income) by allowing a deduction for contribu-
tions to an IRA equal to the lesser of 15% of compensation or $1,500 ($1,750 for a taxpayer with a
nonworking spouse). I.R.C. §§ 219, 220. Beginning in 1982, the deduction is increased to the
lesser of 100% of compensation or $2,000 ($2,250 for a taxpayer with a nonworking spouse).
ERTA, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 311(a), 95 Stat. 277 (1981), reprintedin [1981] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 105 (Supp. 6), amending I.R.C. § 219.
There are two other tax advantages to qualified retirement plans and IRAs. First, the benefi-
ciaries are exempt from tax on income earned by the balance in the plan or in the IRA. I.R.C.
§§ 408(e), 501(a). Second, distributions in the form of annuities are entitled to special treatment
under I.R.C. § 72, and are excluded from the employee's estate at death under I.R.C. §§ 2039(c),
(e). However, distributions from IRAs are not as favorably treated as distributions from qualified
plans. There is a 10% penalty tax on distributions from an IRA before age 59 , I.R.C. § 408(0,
and lump sum distributions from an IRA are not eligible for the special 10-year averaging treat-
ment provided by I.R.C. § 402(e). There are other miscellaneous restrictions on the maintenance
of IRAs contained in I.R.C. § 408 which do not apply to qualified plans.
125. The prohibition applies to active participants in a plan maintained by the taxpayer's em-
ployer which is qualified under I.R.C. § 401(a), an annuity plan under I.R.C. § 403(a), a bond
purchase plan under I.R.C. § 405(a) or a governmental retirement plan. The parallel provision for
married employees with nonworking spouses is contained in I.R.C. § 220(b)(3)(A) (repealed
1981). In general, the provisions of I.R.C. § 220 duplicate those of I.R.C. § 219, and will not be
referred to separately. Thus, any reference in the text to the active participation requirement
should be read as applying to both I.R.C. § 219(b)(2)(A) and I.R.C. § 220(b)(3)(A). Effective
January 1, 1982, the provisions dealing with married participants with nonworking spouses were
incorporated into I.R.C. § 219, and I.R.C. § 220 was repealed. ERTA, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 31 1(c), 95 Stat. 283 (1981), reprinted in 11981] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS Ill (Supp. 6).
126. There have been more than 40 Tax Court cases dealing with the active participant issue.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1763 (1978), afl'd, 620 F.2d 153 (7th Cir.
1980); Pervier v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1706 (1978); Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 69
T.C. 750 (1978), aff'd, 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1979).
127. 69 T.C. 750 (1978), afjd, 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1979). The other basic case setting forth
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being laid off and believing that he would obtain more benefit from an
IRA, unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw from his employer's
plan.128 In November of 1975, he was advised that he would probably
be laid off in the immediate future. He then established an IRA even
though he was still a participant in his employer's plan. He was laid off
in January of 1976 and, since he had not completed the ten years of
service necessary to receive a vested pension benefit, all of his rights
under his employer's plan were forfeited.
129
In concluding that Orzechoswki was an active participant during
1975, the Tax Court relied primarily upon the following statement in
the report of the House Committee on Ways and Means:
An individual is to be considered an active participant in a plan if he
is accruing benefits under the plan even if he only has forfeitable
rights to those benefits. Otherwise, if an individual were able to, e.g.,
accrue benefits under a qualified plan and also make contributions to
an individual retirement account, when he later becomes vested in
the accrued benefits he would receive tax-supported retirement bene-
fits for the same year, both from the qualified plan and the retirement
savings deduction.'
30
Since Orzechowski had clearly been accruing benefits throughout
1975 which were later forfeited in 1976, the court concluded that, de-
spite the harshness of the result under the circumstances of the case, it
had no option but to-disallow Orzechowski the deduction.' 3' The court
went on to review the legislative history of the six percent penalty tax
imposed on excess IRA contributions by section 4973, and concluded
that since Orzechowski could not, as an active participant, have made
any IRA contribution in 1975, his entire contribution was an excess
contribution subject to the penalty. Five dissenters, though agreeing
that Orzechowski was an active participant, felt that the application of
the penalty tax in his case was "abhorrent" and suggested that a dis-
tinction be drawn between employees who over-contribute to an ex-
isting IRA and those who are ineligible to establish an IRA at all
the Tax Court's understanding of the IRA provisions is Guest v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 768
(1979), which considered constitutional objections to various provisions.
128. It is common for pension plan participation to be mandatory, since plans must generally
cover a certain percentage of employees in order to qualify under I.R.C. § 401(a). See I.R.C.
§§ 401(a)(3), 410. The fact that many employees are forced to participate in a plan from which
they derive only minimal benefit and are thereby rendered ineligible to establish an IRA has been
a principal criticism of the active participant rules.
129. See text accompanying notes 159-69 infra for a discussion of vesting and forfeiture.
130. H.R. Rep. No. 807, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1974), reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4794.
131. 69 T.C. at 757.
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because of their active participation in another plan. 132 This distinc-
tion, which appears to have been based more on sympathy for Orze-
chowski than on any plausible reading of the statute, was rejected by
both the majority of the Tax Court and the Second Circuit, which af-
firmed Orzechowski in a brief opinion.
33
The Tax Court was undoubtedly correct in concluding that Orze-
chowski, who was not laid off until 1976, was an active participant dur-
ing 1975. However, the flood of active participant cases in the Tax
Court which followed Orzechowski made no attempt to explore the def-
inition of active participant further. A large number of these cases in-
volved pension plan participants who were laid off during the same
year that they attempted to establish an IRA, and whose rights were
not only forfeitable, but actually forfeited. 34 Nevertheless, these cases
all followed the same pattern. Pursuant to the Tax Court's small case
procedure, the majority of cases were assigned to a special trial judge
for resolution, 35 and such judges invariably recited the facts briefly,
132. Id.
133. 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1979). The dissent in the Tax Court relied heavily upon the fact
that under the IRA provisions as originally drafted, a taxpayer who established an IRA under the
mistaken impression that he was eligible to do so could not withdraw the contribution without
having his contribution again included in his income and paying an additional 10% penalty tax on
early withdrawals. This would occur because the statutory grace period for withdrawal of excess
contributions would probably have expired by the time the taxpayer's eligibility was determined.
See I.R.C. §§ 408(d)(4), 4973(b)(2). Thus, the dissent felt that Congress could not also have in-
tended to impose the six percent excess contribution penalty, particularly since the penalty is as-
sessed every year until the contribution is withdrawn. See I.R.C. § 4973(b)(2). This problem was
resolved in part by the Revenue Act of 1978, which enacted a special grace period and directed the
Service to refund all penalties and taxes based on distributions which corrected excess contribu-
tions. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 157(c), 92 Stat. 2763 (1978) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 408(d)(5)). For a graphic example of the severity with which the Tax Court enforces the penalty,
see Johnson v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1057 (1980), aJt'd, 661 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1981), imposing
the penalty on a taxpayer who, realizing he should not have contributed to an IRA, did not claim
the deduction and reported the IRA's earnings in his income. See also Mitchell v. Commissioner,
42 T.C.M. (CCH) 607 (1981) (penalty imposed on taxpayer who mistakenly established an IRA
even though he was concededly eligible to establish a Keogh Plan).
134. See, e.g., Randall v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 296 (1980); Cavana v. Commis-
sioner, 40 T.C.M. 1169 (CCH) (1980); Andalman v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 773 (1980);
Cooper v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1023 (1979). The foregoing examples are not in-
tended as a complete list. The abbreviated nature of the opinions in these cases, and the fact that
the courts did not regard forfeiture as relevant to an employee's right to establish an IRA, make it
difficult to determine whether the taxpayers in many of the cases had forfeited their benefits.
However, the fact patterns of many of the cases make it reasonable to infer that a forfeiture oc-
curred, particularly where a taxpayer, like Foulkes himself, quit his job in a year which preceded
the effective date of the limitations on forfeiture of ERISA. See text accompanying notes 159-60
infra. The facts of Cooper were conceded by the Seventh Circuit to be indistinguishable from
those of Foulkes. 638 F.2d at 1108.
135. Active participant cases are technically not eligible for the ordinary small case procedure
as defined in I.R.C. § 7463 and rule 171 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, 60 T.C.
1145 (1973), as that procedure applies only to. income, estate and gift taxes and the I.R.C. § 4973
penalty tax is an excise tax. However, rule 180, 60 T.C. 1148 (1973), allows the Chief Judge of the
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cited Orzechowski, expressed regret at the harshness of the law and en-
tered judgment for the Commissioner. Not one of these cases occupies
more than three pages in the reporters, and not one resulted in a victory
for the taxpayer.1
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This pattern was broken by the Seventh Circuit in Foulkes. John
Foulkes left his job in May of 1975 and thereby forfeited all of his
benefits under his employer's pension plan. He established an IRA in
the same year. The Tax Court, with the inevitable citation to Orze-
chowski, concluded that since Foulkes had been accruing benefits
through May of 1975, he was an active participant for part of 1975,
despite the fact that those benefits were later forfeited.137 The Seventh
Circuit, on the other hand, felt that the fact that Foulkes forfeited his
pension during the same year in which he attempted to establish an
IRA distinguished the case from Orzechowski, in which the pension
benefits had been only forfeitable, rather than forfeited, by the end of
that year.
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the Tax Court's conclu-
sion that Foulkes had been an active participant "for any part of" 1975
was a reasonable reading of the statute, 38 but felt that section
219(b)(2)(A) must be interpreted in light of Congress' intent to preclude
an employee from obtaining a benefit from both an IRA and a quali-
fied pension plan during the same year. 139 The court was, however,
compelled to recognize the legislative history relied upon in Orzechow-
ski which indicated that a participant is ineligible to establish an IRA
in a year in which he derives a benefit from a plan, even if his benefit is
forfeitable. Thus, it concluded that the term "active participant" must
be interpreted to mean one who, during the year in which he attempts
to make an IRA contribution, has the potential for obtaining a benefit
from a qualified pension plan. 40 This determination, the court held,
could only be made by taking into account all events occurring during
the year, including, in Foulkes' case, his forfeiture of all benefits.
There is no doubt that the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the
active participant rule is more consistent with the underlying congres-
sional purpose of section 219(b)(2)(A) than is that of the Tax Court.
Tax Court to assign cases which are not small tax cases to a special trial judge for hearings and,
pursuant to General Order No. 6, 69 T.C. xv (1978), this procedure has generally been invoked for
active participant cases.
136. See note 126 supra.
137. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1851-49 (1978).
138. 638 F.2d at 1110.
139. Id. at 1109-10.
140. Id. at 1109.
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Nevertheless, the determination of whether an employee has the poten-
tial for deriving a benefit from a plan in any given year will not always
be as easy to make as it was in Foulkes.' 41 In order to consider the
consequences which may flow from Foulkes, it is necessary to explore
the different types of interests which participants may have in different
types of qualified plans.
There are two basic types of qualified retirement plans: "defined
benefit plans" 42 and "defined contribution plans." 143 In a defined ben-
efit plan (the traditional type of pension plan), the amount of monthly
retirement pension which a participant will receive is fixed in advance
and the employer contributes to the plan the amount which an actuary
determines is necessary to fund that pension.144 In a defined contribu-
tion plan (such as a profit-sharing plan),' 45 the employer contributes an
amount to the plan each year, and the amount of retirement pension
which a participant ultimately receives depends upon the amount of
the contribution that is allocated to his account and the success of the
plan's investments.
Two basic factors must be taken into account in determining the
benefit which a participant derives from either type of plan. These fac-
tors are accrual and forfeiture. Presumably, under the Seventh Cir-
cuit's rationale, a participant would not have the potential to derive a
benefit from a plan in a year in which he either failed to accrue a bene-
141. The Service stipulated that Foulkes had no potential for deriving a benefit from a plan in
1975. Id. at 1110.
142. I.R.C. § 414(j).
143. I.R.C. § 414(i).
144. The permissible actuarial assumptions which may be used in computing the employer's
contribution are set forth in I.R.C. § 412 (defining the minimum required contribution) and I.R.C.
§ 404(a)(1) (defining the maximum deductible contribution).
145. A profit-sharing plan is a plan which provides for contributions out of the employer's
current or accumulated earnings, the amount of which may be determined in the discretion of the
employer. Its primary purpose is to enable employees to share in the employer's profits, rather
than to provide retirement income. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii). A stock bonus plan is also a
defined contribution plan designed to allow employees to share in the profitability of the em-
ployer. It differs from a profit-sharing plan in that contributions need not be limited to current or
accumulated earnings and distributions are made in the form of employer stock. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401-I(b)(1)(iii). Profit-sharing and stock bonus plans are usually classified together and distin-
guished from defined contribution pension plans, commonly referred to as "money purchase"
pension plans. Money purchase pension plans are true pension plans in that their primary pur-
pose is providing retirement income and the employer has an annual requirement to contribute to
them. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(I)(i). The annual contribution to a money purchase pension plan
is usually stated as a percentage of compensation, although there is a special type of money
purchase pension plan, known as a "target benefit" plan, in which the amount of benefit each
employee is to receive is defined and the necessary annual contribution to fund that benefit is
initially calculated. However, the annual contribution requirement remains fixed and the actual
benefit paid depends on the balance in the participant's account, whereas in a true defined benefit
plan the funding requirement changes from year to year based on investment experience, changes
in actuarial assumptions, etc. See Rev. Rul. 76-464, 1976-2 C.B. 115.
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fit, or accrued a benefit but forfeited it before the end of the year.
However, particularly since the enactment of ERISA, it is not always
easy to ascertain when one of these events has taken place.
Accrual is, properly speaking, a concept that relates only to de-
fined benefit plans. 146 The amount of benefit a participant receives
from a defined benefit plan depends in part on the participant's length
of service; accordingly, the participant is said to accrue a portion of his
benefit for each period of service that he completes. For example, a
typical union pension plan may provide that union members are to re-
ceive a retirement pension of ten dollars per month for each year of
service completed with the employer. A participant in such a plan
would accrue a ten dollar per month benefit for each year of service
which he completes. 147 Because a defined contribution plan has no
formula defining the amount of benefit received, there is, strictly speak-
ing, no accrual of benefits under such a plan. However, the making of
contributions to a defined contribution plan is in a sense analogous to
the accrual of benefits, because the contributions are added to a partici-
pant's account and increase the amount of benefit which he ultimately
receives. 14 8
In the case of "accruals" under a defined contribution plan, section
1.219-2 of the regulations, which defines the term "active participant,"
appears to be consistent with the Seventh Circuit's approach. The reg-
ulation provides that an employee is only considered to be an active
participant in a defined contribution plan if an amount is added to his
account sometime during the year. 149 However, some Tax Court cases,
146. I.R.C. § 41 1(b), which specifies permitted accrual formulae, applies only to defined bene-
fit plans. See I.R.C. § 411 (a).
147. Such a plan is known as a unit benefit plan. Union-negotiated plans typically provide for
the accrual of a fixed amount each year regardless of compensation, whereas nonunion plans often
provide that the accrual is dependent either on compensation received during the year (a "career
pay plan") or on average compensation received during a stated period of time, such as the final
three years of employment (a "final average plan"). Plans in which the benefit is not based upon
the period of employment (although there may be a minimum length of employment required to
accrue a benefit) are known as "flat percentage" (if the benefit is stated as a percentage of compen-
sation) or "flat benefit" plans.
148. Some of the regulations under ERISA treat the balance in a participant's account in a
defined contribution plan as an "accrual." See Treas. Reg. § 1.41 l(a)-7(a)(2).
149. In fact, Treas. Reg. § 1.219-2(c) provides that an employee is an active participant in a
money purchase plan in the year in which a contribution is allocated to his account, while Treas.
Reg. § 1.219-2(d) provides that an employee is a participant in a profit-sharing or stock bonus
plan in the year in which a contribution is actually paid to his account (unless the contribution is
supplementary to a contribution paid and allocated in a previous year). See Treas. Reg. § 1.219-
2(d)(2). This distinction may cause problems, as many employers follow the practice of allocating
their annual contribution among participants as of the last day of the year, but not actually paying
it until the following year, because I.R.C. § 404(a)(6) allows a contribution to be deducted if made
before the employer's tax return for the year is due. If an employer maintains both a profit-
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without discussing the regulations, have held employees to be active
participants in defined contribution plans in years in which they re-
ceived no contribution allocations.' 50 These cases can only be viewed
as a product of the cursory treatment the Tax Court gives active partici-
pant cases in general. They are wrongly decided, and the rule may be
taken as settled that an employee is not an active participant in a de-
sharing and a money purchase pension plan and contributes to both simultaneously, its employees
thereby become active participants in two years because of what is, in practical effect, one contri-
bution. The reason for the distinction is apparently that the obligation to contribute to a money
purchase plan is fixed at the end of a year, so that it is reasonable to determine an employee's
active participant status at that time, whereas profit-sharing and stock bonus contributions may be
discretionary, and therefore an employee's active participant status should not be determined until
a contribution is actually made.
150. See, e.g., Andalman v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 773 (1980). The active partici-
pant regulation, as originally proposed on February 21, 1975, provided that an employee was an
active participant if either the employer was obligated to make a contribution to the plan on the
employee's behalf or if the employer would be obligated to allocate a portion of its contribution to
the employee if a contribution were made. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.219-1(c)(ii) (A), 40 Fed. Reg.
7661 (1975). This provision would have made an employee an active participant in a profit-shar-
ing or stock bonus plan in a year in which the employer decided to make no contribution, which
was clearly unfair. The proposed regulation was reproposed on March 23, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg.
17754 (1979), in substantially the same form in which it was finally adopted on August 7, 1980.
T.D. 7714, 1980-2 C.B. 83. Even under the original proposal, however, an employee who, like
Andalman, had no right to have a contribution allocated to his account because he was not em-
ployed on the last day of the year should not be considered an active participant. See text accom-
panying note 151 infra. This provision was not even discussed by the Tax Court, which relied
solely on Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 750 (1978), aft'd, 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1979).
The Service had announced that taxpayers could rely on the proposed regulation pending the
issuance of a final regulation. See Technical Information Release-1425 (Dec. 12, 1975). Thus,
Andalman apparently lost his case through his failure---and that of the special trial judge--to
keep up on the Service's technical information releases.
An even more troubling case is Smith v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1621 (1981), a
post-Foulkes case in which the facts were substantially identical to those inAndalman. In addition
to completely ignoring the proposed regulations, as it had done in Andalman, the Tax Court in
Smith distinguished Foulkes by holding that Smith had received a "potential benefit" from his
employer's plan in the year in which he terminated his employment because if he were reem-
ployed and new contributions were made to his account, his pretermination service could be
counted for vesting purposes under the "rule of parity" of I.R.C. § 41 l(a)(6)(D). Thus, Smith
appears to take the position that an employee may be an active participant in a year in which he
accrues no benefit, but increases his vested percentage in a benefit which either previously accrued
or might accrue in the future. This holding is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the
difference between vesting and accrual. A plan participant who completes a required vesting pe-
riod does not thereby acquire a new retirement benefit, but merely satisfies a necessary condition
for the receipt of the benefit previously accrued. Under the Smith court's theory, the same benefit
could cause an employee to be an active participant in several different years-the year in which it
accrues, and each year in which a portion of it vests. This would be contrary not only to Treas.
Reg. § 1.219-2(c) and Treas. Reg. § 1.219-2(d), see note 149 supra, but also to each other provision
of the regulations that provides that a participant is not an active participant in a year in which,
for whatever reason, he does not accrue a benefit, since his service during that year may always
increase his vested interest in a benefit accrued in another year. See notes 153 & 158 infra. In
fact, since the general rule is that all service must be counted for vesting purposes, with certain
limited exceptions, under an extreme reading of Smith an employee whose employer maintains a
plan would always be an active participant, since it is always possible that the employee will
accrue a benefit at some later time. See I.R.C. § 41 1(a)(4).
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fined contribution plan if no money is added to his account in the plan
during the year, regardless of whether he is covered by the plan's eligi-
bility provisions during the year. This rule will to some degree allevi-
ate the problem of mid-year employment terminations for participants
in defined contribution plans, since such plans frequently require that a
participant be employed on the last day of a year in order to receive a
share of that year's contribution.' 5 '
However, there is no such consensus with regard to defined benefit
plans under which true accruals take place. Section 1.219-2 of the reg-
ulations states the general rule that an employee is an active participant
in a defined benefit plan if he meets the plan's eligibility requirements,
regardless of whether he actually accrues a benefit during the year.'
5 2
An exception is made for plans which are integrated with Social Secur-
ity in which the participant does not earn enough to accrue a benefit,
apparently in recognition of the fact that many employees are nominal
participants in plans which in fact benefit only highly paid employees
through use of integration. 53 However, there are many situations
other than integration in which an employee may be covered by a
plan's eligibility provisions but not accrue benefits. Most commonly,
many plans provide that an employee must work at least 1,000 hours
151. Such provisions are generally permitted. See Department of Labor Regulations, 29
C.F.R. § 2530.200b-1(b) (1980). However, if a plan denies a share of the year's contributions to
employees who have completed a "year of service," see note 161 infra, because they are not em-
ployed on the last day of the year, and such provision has the effect of discriminating in favor of
officers, shareholders or highly compensated employees, as may occur if a plan has high turnover
among low-paid employees, it may cause the plan to be disqualified. See Rev. Rul. 76-250, 1976-2
C.B. 124. Accordingly, many plans provide that an employee who has completed a year of service
is entitled to a contribution even if he leaves before the last day of the year.
Most of the rules governing a plan's permissible vesting, accrual and participation provisions
are contained in both I.R.C. §§ 410, 411 and in the "labor" portion of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1061 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). This article will cite the applicable Code provisions only and not
the parallel ERISA provisions. However, a number of the regulations which are applicable in the
interpretation of I.R.C. §§ 410, 411 were originally issued by the Department of Labor. Pursuant
to Reorganization Plan No. 4, 43 Fed. Reg. 47713 (1975), 92 Stat. 3793 (1975), the Treasury De-
partment now has jurisdiction over such regulations.
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.219-2(b)(1).
153. Id. "Integration" is based on the theory that each employee's private pension plan bene-
fits and Social Security benefits should be considered together, or "integrated," in determining
whether a plan discriminates in favor of highly compensated individuals. Since Social Security
benefits are based solely on earnings up to the contribution and benefit base established under 42
U.S.C. § 230 (1976), this allows an integrated plan to disproportionately favor earnings above that
base. The statutory basis for integration is found in I.R.C. § 401(a)(5), and the tests which are
followed in determining if a plan is properly integrated are found in Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(e) and
Rev. Rul. 71-446, 1971-2 C.B. 187. The existing active participant regulation technically deals
only with employees who are participants in an "excess" integrated plan in which benefits are
based on compensation in excess of the Social Security base wage. An amendment to the regula-
tion dealing with "offset" plans, in which a participant's benefit is reduced by Social Security
benefits received, was proposed on July 14, 1981. See 46 Fed. Reg. 36198 (1981).
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for the employer during a year in order to accrue a benefit for that
year. 154 The regulation appears to consider such employees active par-
ticipants. It seems to follow from the rationale of Foulkes that the Sev-
enth Circuit would not consider them active participants, since they
derive no benefit from the plan for the year. The Tax Court has not
addressed the issue and, considering its track record, it would probably
uphold the regulation, if it bothered to discuss it at all, although it
would no doubt apologize for the harshness of the rule.'
55
In summary, the regulation's position on accrual under defined
benefit plans is not only inconsistent with its position on defined contri-
bution plans, but appears to ignore the word "active" in the phrase
"active participant"; the Seventh Circuit's opinion provides a basis for
considering the regulation invalid.
156
Another accrual issue arises where a participant in a defined bene-
fit plan has fully accrued his benefit. Some plans provide that a benefit
is fully accrued after a certain period of time, such as thirty years of
service.' 5 7 An employee who continues to work after thirty years can
derive no further benefit from his employer's plan, and thus under the
literal terms of the Foulkes rationale would be eligible to establish an
IRA. On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit could reasonably assume
that Congress did not intend for an employee who had fully accrued a
benefit from an employer's plan to be eligible for an IRA, in that the
basic purpose of IRAs was to provide retirement benefits for those who
154. A plan is required to compute service for accrual purposes on a "reasonable and consis-
tent basis," I.R.C. § 41 l(b)(3)(A), but may disregard any year in which an employee works fewer
than 1,000 hours. I.R.C. § 41 1(b)(3)(C).
There is another situation in which an employee may be eligible to participate in a plan but
not accrue any benefits, which can act as a trap for the unwary. The maximum period of service a
lan may generally require as a requirement for participation is one year of service. I.R.C.
410(a)(1)(A)(ii). Furthermore, an employee must be made a participant within six months after
he completes the year of service. I.R.C. § 410(a)(4). Unlike the computation of years of service
for vesting and years of participation for accrual, which can use, any reasonable computational
period, years of service for eligibility must include the first twelve months during which an em-
ployee is employed. Department of Labor Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 2530.202-2(a) (1980). Thus,
an employee may become a participant sometime in the middle of the plan's accrual computa-
tional period, too late to complete 1,000 hours of service after beginning participation. In fact,
many plans make a new employee a participant on the last day of the plan year in which he
completes his eligibility period, but begin accruals in the following year. Such an employee is
arguably an active participant for one day during the year, and therefore ineligible to establish an
IRA.
155. See text accompanying note 131 supra.
156. In fact, the Seventh Circuit explicitly stated that it would not follow the proposed regula-
tion if adopted, although it was referring to the original proposals described in note 150 supra.
638 F.2d at 1110 n.17.
157. The various limitations on the length of time that can be required for a full accrual are set
forth in I.R.C. § 411(b)(l).
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are not covered by an employer's plan. 58
Assuming, however, that an employee has accrued a benefit during
some part of a tax year, the possibility remains that he may forfeit that
benefit later in the year. This, of course, was the situation in both
Foulkes and Orzechowski, and it appears to be the one most frequently
litigated in the Tax Court. Foulkes dealt with the simplest possible case
because the year involved was 1975. Due to the staggered effective
dates of the various provisions of ERISA, the IRA provisions went into
effect for 1975,159 but many of the substantive restrictions upon the op-
eration of a qualified pension plan, including limitations on forfeiture,
were postponed until 1976 for plans already in existence when ERISA
was enacted. 160 Accordingly, when Foulkes quit his job in May of
1975, he permanently and irrevocably forfeited all of his accrued bene-
fits under his employer's pension plan, which made it easy for the Sev-
enth Circuit to conclude that he had no possibility of ever deriving a
benefit from that plan as of the end of 1975. However, under ERISA,
an employee who forfeits any portion of his benefit upon terminating
his employment must have the forfeited benefit restored to him if he is
reemployed before incurring a "break in service."' 6' Thus, if Foulkes
158. The Service has ruled that an employee who has fully accrued his maximum benefit is
nevertheless still an active participant. Private Letter Ruling 8016094 (Jan. 24, 1980). It should
also be noted that the benefit of an employee who has ceased accruals may continue to increase
because the amount of the benefit is tied to his compensation during his final years of employ-
ment. In the context of a "frozen" plan, discussed below, the regulation takes the position that
such increases cause the employee to be an active participant. This position would appear incon-
sistent with the theory that Congress was primarily concerned with accruals of new benefits, not
increases in value of benefits already accrued. For example, it has never been suggested that a
defined contribution plan participant should be considered an active participant in a year merely
because investment returns increase the value of his benefit. The regulation also provides that an
employee who has ceased accruing benefits because he has passed the age at which benefit accrual
ceases (typically the normal retirement age) ceases to be an active participant. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.219-2(b)(4). This distinction, whatever the reason behind it, is of limited value to most over-
retirement age employees, as an employee may not contribute to an IRA in or after the year in
which he reaches age 70 . I.R.C. § 219(b) (amended 1981) (current version at I.R.C. § 219(d)(l)).
Before leaving the topic of accruals, two other exceptions to active participant under Treas.
Reg. § 1.219-2 should be noted: participants in a "frozen" plan in which accruals have ceased for
all participants (but not if the amount of the benefit to be paid may vary with future compensa-
tion), Treas. Reg. § 1.219-2(b)(3), and employees who choose not to participate in a voluntary
plan, Treas. Reg. § 1.219-2(0. The proposed amendments to § 1.219-2, see note 153 supra, would
also exempt certain persons covered by governmental plans on a part-time basis (i.e., armed forces
reservists and volunteer firemen).
159. ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2002(i), 88 Stat. 971 (1974).
160. Id. § 1017(b), 88 Stat. 932 (1974). For new plans, the vesting rules went into effect on the
date of enactment of ERISA. Id. § 1017(a).
161. Technically, ERISA provides that all of an employee's "years of service" (generally a
computational period in which he works for at least 1,000 hours of service) with an employer must
be counted for vesting purposes except, inter alia, for years prior to the computational period in
which he incurs a break in service. I.R.C. §§ 41 l(a)(4)(D), 41 l(a)(6). In practice, this means that
an employee who quits and is rehired without incurring a break in service is treated for vesting
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had quit his job in May of 1976 instead of May of 1975, he may still
have had the potential of realizing a benefit from his employer's plan
for 1976, and the Seventh Circuit would have had a much harder case.
How much more difficult the case would have been would have de-
pended upon the method used by his employer's plan to compute
breaks in service.
A break in service is generally defined as a "computational pe-
riod" during which a participant completes 500 or fewer hours of serv-
ice. 162 Assume Foulkes' employer's plan, after amendment to comply
with ERISA, uses a calendar year both as its fiscal year and for pur-
poses of computing breaks in service. 63 In this situation, it is easy to
ascertain at the end of the year whether a terminated employee has any
possibility of having his forfeited benefits restored to him. Thus, if
Foulkes quit his job in May of 1980 rather than 1975, all that would be
necessary would be to add up the number of hours that he worked in
1980 prior to quitting. If it were 500 hours or less, he would be able to
establish an IRA in 1980. It will, however, be recalled that, although
an employee need only work more than 500 hours to avoid a break in
service, many plans require him to work at least 1,000 hours in a year
in order to accrue a benefit. In such a plan, an employee who works
between 500 and 1,000 hours in a year before quitting would still have
a chance of receiving benefits accrued in prior years, but would accrue
no benefit for the current year, and presumably under Foulkes could
establish an IRA. 64
purposes as though he never quit (although, if he works for fewer than 1,000 hours of service
during any year because of the fact that he was employed for only part of the year, the year will
not be considered a year of service). There is one important exception: if an employee is partially
vested when he quits and receives a distribution of the vested portion of his account, he may be
required to repay the distribution upon being reemployed as a condition to having his forfeited
benefit restored. See I.R.C. § 41 l(a)(7)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.41 l(a)-7(d).
Technically, when an employee terminates his employment, a defined contribution plan may
either provide for an immediate forfeiture with a restoration of benefits if he is reemployed with-
out incurring a break in service, or for a delayed forfeiture which does not become effective until a
break in service is incurred. Treas. Reg. § 1.41 1(a)-7(d)(2)(iv). Courts should avoid adding fur-
ther complexity to this area by regarding both types of forfeiture as equivalent for active partici-
pant purposes.
The vesting restrictions comprise one of the most complex areas of ERISA, and the foregoing
is intended as no more than a brief sketch of the rules relevant to the active participant issue.
162. I.R.C. § 411 (a)(6)(A). For the rules governing the calculation of hours of service, see
Department of Labor Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 2530.200b-2 (1980).
163. A plan may use any 12-month period as a vesting computation period, provided it does
not result in an "artificial postponement" of vesting. Department of Labor Regulations, 29 C.F.R.
§ 2530.203-2 (1980). The plan's fiscal year (which is often, but is not required to be, the same as
the employer's) is probably the most common computational period.
164. This example assumes that the vesting and accrual computational periods are the same,
which they need not be. See Department of Labor Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 2530.200b-l(a)
(1980).
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Assume, on the other hand, that the plan's computational period
for determining breaks in service is based not on its accounting period,
but upon anniversaries of the day on which the employee was hired.
Now assume that Foulkes was originally hired on a February 1, and
again leaves the job in May of 1980, having worked fewer than 500
hours since February 1, 1980. Technically, he has not incurred a break
in service as of December 31, 1980 because he has until January 31,
1981 to complete his more than 500 hours. Presumably, the Seventh
Circuit would regard him as ineligible to establish an IRA, since it is
still possible that he could eventually receive the benefit that he accrued
in 1980.
But what if he quits on February 1, 1980, having completed no
hours during the computational period? Then, he would not have in-
curred a break in service by December 31, 1980, but in order to avoid a
break in service it would be necessary for him to work twenty-hour
days throughout the month of January in order to complete his more
than 500 hours by January 31, 1981. It may thus be said that by any
practical standard he has no possibility of receiving the benefit which
he accrued in 1980. However, if the court were to rule that Foulkes was
therefore eligible to establish an IRA in 1980, it would be only a matter
of time before it was asked to determine whether it is possible for an
employee to work, for example, 200 hours in a single month, and it
would wind up taking evidence on the availability of overtime during
the month of January in a particular industry. In order to avoid being
drawn into such a morass, the court would presumably establish the
rule that an employee must have actually incurred a break in service
within a year in order to be eligible to contribute to an IRA in that
year.
It should be noted, however, that many plans which do not use
their fiscal year for computational purposes also do not use the hours of
service method at all, but rather use the "elapsed time" method of com-
puting service. Under the elapsed time method, an employee is given
credit for service solely for the length of time that he is actually em-
ployed, regardless of how many hours he works.' 65 In order for an
employee to incur a break in service under the elapsed time method, a
full year must pass after he terminates employment. 66 Thus, an em-
165. Treas. Reg. § 1.410(a)-(7)(a)(1).
166. The equivalent of a break in service under the elapsed time method is a "one-year period
of severance," defined as a 12-month period ending on the anniversary of the day an employee
terminates employment during which he does not perform any hours of service. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.4 1O(a)-(7)(d)(4).
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ployee under the elapsed time method would never incur a break in
service in the same year in which he quit and would never be eligible
for the benefits of the Foulkes decision.
.Similar problems arise if a plan uses its fiscal year to compute
breaks in service, but its fiscal year is not the calendar year. In this
regard, it should be noted that the regulation provides that an em-
ployee is ineligible to establish an IRA in a year if he is an active par-
ticipant in a plan for any plan year which ends within the year.
167
Thus, if Foulkes were a participant in a plan with a January 31 fiscal
year, and if as of January 31, 1980 he had accrued and not forfeited a
benefit under that plan for its fiscal year ending on that date, he would
be ineligible to establish an IRA in 1980, and anything which occurred
after that date would be relevant only to his eligibility in 1981. This
rule finds little support in either the literal language of section
219(b)(2)(A) or Foulkes, but it may be useful in avoiding some of the
kinds of problems discussed above.
It thus appears that if Foulkes is interpreted as applying only to
employees who both forfeit their benefits and incur a break in service-
and the Tax Court has already announced that it agrees with this inter-
pretationt 68-the break in service rules will effectively preclude a large
number of terminating employees from eligibility to contribute to an
IRA. It should also be kept in mind that the foregoing discussion has
assumed that an employee who terminates his employment forfeits his
entire benefit. In fact, many plans provide that benefits vest over a
period of years, 69 and an employee who accrues a benefit during a
167. The regulation is not concerned with the operation of the vesting rules, since the Service
views vesting as irrelevant to active participant status. Accordingly, this rule is applied only to
defined benefit plans, with regard to which an employee's eligibility to participate during a plan
year is determinative, Treas. Reg. § 1.219-2(b), and money purchase plans, with regard to which
the allocation of contributions to an employee's account for a plan year is determinative. Treas.
Reg. § 1.219-2(c). It does not apply to profit-sharing or stock bonus plans, since the regulation
takes the position that an employee is an active participant in the calendar year in which a contri-
bution is actually made, and plan years are therefore irrelevant. Treas. Reg. § 1.219-2(d).
168. Chapman v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. No. 33 (Aug. 24, 1981). See also Boykin v. Commis-
sioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 803, 805 (1981).
169. The type of vesting assumed in the discussion, in which 100% of a participant's benefit
vests after a specified period of time, is known as "cliff" vesting, and the maximum length of
service that can be required for cliff vesting under ERISA is 10 years. I.R.C. § 411 (a)(2)(A). So-
called "10-year cliff' (or simply "10-cliff') vesting is common in union plans and plans of large
public corporations, but most other plans use some form of graduated vesting schedule. The grad-
uated vesting schedules permitted under ERISA are "5- to 15-year vesting", I.R.C. § 41 l(a)(2)(B),
and "rule of 45 vesting". I.R.C. § 41 l(a)(2)(C). Any plan whose vesting schedule is at least as
rapid as one of these alternatives meets the minimum vesting standard of ERISA.- However, in
addition, I.R.C. § 41 l(d)(l) provides that a plan will not qualify if its vesting schedule has the
effect of discriminating in favor of officers, shareholders and highly compensated employees, as
may occur if a disproportionately large number of low-paid employees forfeit their benefits due to
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year and then quits and incurs a break in service during the year, but
because of previous service forfeits only ninety percent of his accrued
benefit, would presumably still be considered an active participant.
Effective in 1982, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, in the
name of increasing savings incentives, abolished the active participant
rule and allows anyone with sufficient compensation to establish an
IRA.170 However, the great number of IRA cases already decided by
the Tax Court arise almost exclusively out of 1975 and 1976, and it is a
reasonable inference that the years 1977 through 1981 will also yield a
bumper crop of IRA cases for the courts to decide.
The overwhelming impression received from the IRA cases al-
ready reported is that the great majority of taxpayers simply assume
that they may establish an IRA at any time that they are not working
for a company which covers them with a pension plan, regardless of
whether they are covered by the technical definition of active partici-
pant that has been developed by the regulations and the Tax Court. In
such a situation, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Foulkes may save a
few taxpayers from inadvertent violations of section 219(b)(2)(A), and
it is to be hoped that Congress' abandonment of the active participant
requirement may prompt other courts to adopt the Seventh Circuit's
more reasonable approach, although the Fifth Circuit has already de-
clined to do so.' 7' It seems likely, however, that most taxpayers who
employee turnover. Because of this rule, a very common vesting schedule is "4/40 vesting" (40%
vested after four years, 5% per year for the next two years, and 10% per year thereafter), which the
Service has treated as a safe harbor for advance ruling purposes. See Rev. Proc. 75-49, 1975-2
C.B. 589, mod#Fedby Rev. Proc. 76-11, 1976-1 C.B. 550. Whether 4/40 should be an absolute safe
harbor (except in the case of an employer who deliberately fires employees to prevent vesting) is
one of the most hotly-disputed current issues in pension law. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.411 (d)-l,
45 Fed. Reg. 24201, 39869 (1980).
170. ERTA, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 311, 95 Stat. 277 (1981), reprinted in [1981] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 105 (Supp. 6). The Act also allows a participant in a qualified plan to deduct
certain voluntary contributions made to the plan (subject to the same limits as IRAs), eliminates
the 15% of compensation rule and allows contribution, up to the full amount of compensation, and
raises the overall ceiling on contributions to $2,000 ($2,250 for a taxpayer with a nonworking
spouse).
171. Johnson v. Commissioner, 661 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1981): The court commented on the
harshness of the law, but did not consider it worth the effort to examine the issue, contenting itself
with the fiat statement that if the facts in Foulkes could not be distinguished, the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning would not be followed. The Tax Court, in Chapman v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. No. 33
(Aug. 24, 1981), reserved the question of whether it would accept Foulkes or adhere to its previous
position outside of the Seventh Circuit. In sever1 recent cases, the Tax Court has avoided the
Foulkes issue by requiring taxpayers to prove that they had no possibility of deriving a benefit
from their plan, which, as unsophisticatedpro se litigators, the taxpayers have been unable to do.
See Smith v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1621 (1981); Bogaards v. Commissioner, 42
T.C.M. (CCH) 1177 (1981); Boykin v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 803 (1981). Interestingly,
in Turner v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1434 (1981), the Tax Court, without mentioning
Foulkes, departed from its strict construction approach by holding that an Air Force officer was
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are saved by Foulkes will be as blissfully unaware that they were within
the Foulkes exception to active participant status as they were unaware
that they could have been considered an active participant in the first
place.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
Tax Benefit Rule
During this last term, the Seventh Circuit also heard two cases
which dealt with the ever-elusive tax benefit rule.
172
In a per curiam decision, the court affirmed the panel decision in
Home Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commissioner. 73 It held that the "tax
benefit rule may not be invoked unless the items sought to be excluded
from taxation are asserted to be taxable only by means of the exclu-
sionary aspect of the tax benefit rule."'
74
In Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner,175 the court, for the
second time in two years, was presented with a case arising out of the
abolition of the Illinois personal property tax. Just last year, the court
had faced the same issue in First Trust & Savings Bank of Taylorville v.
Commissioner. 176 Briefly stated, the Hillsboro National Bank, in keep-
not an active participant in a government plan when, by statute, he would be required to retire
before becoming eligible for a pension.
172. One of the most commonly accepted definitions of the tax benefit rule can be found in
one of the leading cases on the subject: "The tax benefit rule provides that an item properly offset
against gross income in determining one year's tax liability is includable in gross income when it is
recovered in a subsequent year." Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440,
446 (1975), aftld, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
This definition represents an oversimplification of a rule which has presented many compli-
cated issues. See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970) (Supreme Court resolution of
circuit court conflict as to the proper method of treating bad debt reserves on the transfer of
accounts receivable in an I.R.C. § 351 exchange); In re Munter, 63 T.C. 663 (1975) (unresolved
question whether the tax benefit rule applies to I.R.C. § 336).
The rule also has been described as one of "inclusion and exclusion: recovery of an item
previously deducted must be included in income; that portion of the recovery not resulting in a
prior tax benefit is excluded." Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 652, 664 n.10 (1976), afI'd,
601 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis in original), citedin Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner,
639 F.2d 333, 650 n.l (7th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
For recent articles discussing the tax benefit rule, see, e.g., Bishop, The Tax Beneft Rule After
Uinvert." Does it Compromise he Statute of Limitations, 51 J. TAX. 272 (1979); Bittker & Kanner,
The Tax Benet Rule, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 265 (1978); Note, Scope of Tax Benft Rule Limited,
32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 487 (1977).
173. 639 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), ae'g 639 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1980).
174. Id at 350. The panel decision was decided during the 1979-80 term and is discussed in
detail in last year's Seventh Circuit Review: Belkin, Taxation.- Some Guidelinesfor Structuring
Transactions, 57 CHI. KENT L. REV. 271 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Belkin]. No further discus-
sion of the case is presented here.
175. 641 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3570 (Jan. 19, 1982).
176. 614 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1980). This case is also discussed in detail in last year's Seventh
Circuit Review. See Belkin, supra note 174, at 289-90.
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ing with the custom of Illinois banks, paid the Illinois personal prop-
erty tax on behalf of its shareholders. 77 In 1972, while the abolition of
the tax was the subject of litigation, 78 the bank paid the tax into escrow
pursuant to a statutory directive 79 and deducted the payments from its
1972 federal income tax return. In 1973, after the amendment abolish-
ing the personal property tax was declared constitutional, the amounts
held in escrow were refunded directly to the shareholders. 80 The bank
did not treat the refund as a taxable event in its tax return; however, the
Commissioner claimed that the refund should have been reported as
income under the provisions of the tax benefit rule and section 111 of
the Code.' The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's contention
and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.'8 2 The Seventh Circuit thereby con-
tinued to adhere to its interpretation of the tax benefit rule, an interpre-
tation which has split the circuits. 
83
177. Arguably these payments could be deemed a constructive dividend; however, such pay-
ments are deductible by a bank pursuant to I.R.C. § 164(e).
178. In 1970, the Illinois Constitution abolished the personal property tax as to individual
taxpayers only. ILL. CONST. art. IX-A (1970) (effective Jan. 1, 1971). In 1971, the Illinois
Supreme Court ruled the amendment unconstitutional as violative of equal protection. Lake
Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 Ill. 2d 137, 273 N.E.2d 592 (1971). However, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, finding no violation of the equal protection clause. Lehnhausen v.
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
179. While the litigation was pending, the Illinois legislature directed that the taxes be paid
into escrow with the proviso that they be refunded if the amendment were ultimately upheld. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 676.01 (1972) (repealed 1981).
180. The taxes were refunded to the shareholders even though the bank had actually paid
them. This was held to be the proper procedure in Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Cullerton, 18 Ill. App.
3d 953, 310 N.E.2d 845 (1974).
181. I.R.C. § I I I(a) provides that "[g]ross income does not include income attributable to the
recovery during the taxable year of a bad debt, prior tax, or delinquent amount, to the extent of
the amount of the recovery exclusion with respect to such debt, tax, or amount." The recovery
exclusion is defined as "the amount, determined in accordance with regulations prescribed by the
Secretary or his delegate, of the deductions or credits allowed.. . which did not result in a reduc-
tion of the taxpayer's tax under this subtitle. . . reduced by the amount excludable in previous
taxable years with respect to such debt, tax, or amount under this section." Id. § 11 (b)(4).
The tax benefit rule's application in these circumstances provides for the taxpayer "making
up for an unwarranted deduction taken in Year One by adding to his reported income in Year
Two." Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 529, 531 n.l (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted,
50 U.S.L.W. 3570 (Jan. 19, 1982). In Hillsboro, the unwarranted deduction was the payment of
taxes which the taxpayer was not obligated to pay.
182. 73 T.C. 61 (1979), aft'd, 641 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981).
183. The Seventh Circuit follows the definition of the tax benefit rule set forth in Tennessee-
Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440 (1975), aft'd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979). This definition provides that a "recovery" of a previously de-
ducted item occurs when there is a later event inconsistent with the deductibility of the item such
as, in Hillsboro, abolition of the tax. See note 172 sjpra. The Ninth Circuit has developed its own
definition of the tax benefit rule which does not follow the definition set forth in Tennessee-Caro-
lina. In Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963), the Ninth Circuit
held that the tax benefit rule does not apply where a "recovery" does not confer any economic
benefit on the entity making the recovery. Just recently, the Ninth Circuit, citing Tennessee-Caro-
lina, First Trust and Hillsboro as opposite decisions, continued to adhere to its holding in South
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The only factual difference between Hillsboro and First Trust was
that in Hillsboro the refund check was made payable directly to share-
holders, whereas in First Trust, the check was made payable jointly to
the bank and the shareholders. 184 The court held that this distinction
was irrelevant and that Hillsboro was directly controlled by First Trust,
reasoning that in First Trust the bank was under a legal obligation to
turn over the refunds to its shareholders. 185 The court, thereby prop-
erly upheld its decision from the previous session and rejected Judge
Pell's call, in dissent, for the overruling of First Trust.186 As pointed
out in last year's Seventh Circuit Review, the application of the tax
benefit rule in these circumstances makes eminent sense. While the net
effect is that the bank has expended funds for which it has not received
a deduction, it is a proper result because it has in essence paid a divi-
dend, albeit indirectly, to its shareholders.1
87
"Wages" vs. "Income"
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided in Centralllli-
nois Public Service Co. v. United States 88 that the terms "wages" and
"income" are not necessarily the same.' 8 9 The Court concluded that
although certain meal reimbursements given to employees constituted
taxable income, 190 such income was not wages subject to income tax
withholding.' 9' The Court noted that Congress confined the employer
withholding requirement 92 to wages in order to achieve simplicity and
ease of administration. 193 The Court added that since "the employer is
Lake Farms. Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 645 F.2d 19, 20 (9th Cir. 1981). The Supreme
Court has recently granted certiorari to both Hillsboro and Bliss Dairy and has consolidated them
for review. 50 U.S.L.W. 3570 (Jan. 19, 1982).
184. 641 F.2d at 531.
185. Id. See note 180 supra.
186. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the facts presented by First Trust were
different because there "the bank as joint payee, made an 'actual recovery' of the previously de-
ducted state tax." 641 F.2d at 531. Judge Pell, in dissent, found this argument convincing, reason-
ing that the bank was in a position to dictate the disposition of the refunds in First Trust, whereas
in Hilsboro it could not. Id. at 534 (Pell, J., dissenting).
187. See Belkin, supra note 174, at 290. The shareholders would have to report the refunds
received as taxable income. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7).
188. 435 U.S. 21 (1978).
189. Id. at 25.
190. The company had a practice whereby it reimbursed some of its employees for lunch
expenses incurred while on authorized travel. Although not before the Court, these meal reim-
bursements clearly were taxable income since they did not meet the requirements for exclusion set
out in I.R.C. § 119 which requires that meals be furnished on the business premises of the em-
ployer apd for the employer's convenience.
191. 435 U.S. at 33.
192. I.R.C. § 3402.
193. 435 U.S. at 29.
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in a secondary position as to liability for any tax of the employee, it is a
matter of obvious concern that, absent further specific congressional
action, the employer's obligation to withhold be precise and not specu-
lative." 194 Since there was no ruling or regulation declaring any with-
holding requirement for meal reimbursements or declaring such
reimbursements to be wages, the Court concluded that such a with-
holding requirement would be an undue burden on an employer. 195
In Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, 96 the Seventh Circuit
faced an extension of the Central Illinois issue. At issue in Oscar
Mayer was whether compensation received by employees for personal
use of company automobiles constituted "wages" for purposes of the
employer withholding obligations under the Federal Insurance Contri-
butions Act 197 and Federal Unemployment Tax Act.' 98 Based on Cen-
tral Illinois, the Service conceded that the deemed compensation was
not "wages" subject to federal income tax withholding; however, it
claimed that the compensation was "wages" for purposes of the FICA
and FUTA taxes. 199
The Service claimed that the term "wages" under the withholding
statutes should be given a different meaning than for FICA and FUTA
purposes, asserting that Central Illinois did not suggest any other con-
clusion.2°° The Service also relied on the FICA and FUTA regulations
which provided that remuneration can be payable in a medium other
than cash and still be subject to the withholding provisions.20'
The Seventh Circuit found the Service's contentions unconvincing,
concluding that Congress intended the term "wages" to "be construed
for FICA and FUTA purposes congruently with the manner Central
194. Id. at 31. I.R.C. § 3403 provides for employer liability for the amount of the tax required
to be deducted.
195. 435 U.S. at 32. The issue of whether lunch reimbursements were ever gross income was
not clearly settled until the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434
U.S. 77 (1977). The withholding requirement at issue in Central Illinois related to lunch reim-
bursements paid in 1963.
196. 623 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1980).
197. I.R.C. §§ 3101-3126 [hereinafter referred to as FICA]. Employers are required to with-
hold FICA taxes from employees' wages pursuant to I.R.C. § 3102.
198. I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311 [hereinafter referred to as FUTA]. There is no withholding require-
ment under the FUTA provisions; rather, the tax is imposed directly on employers based on a
certain portion of its employees' "wages."
199. 623 F.2d at 1225.
200. Id. at 1225-26.
201. Treas. Reg § 31.3121(a)-l(e). This regulation provides, in pertinent part: "Generally the
medium in which the remuneration is paid is also immaterial. It may be paid in cash or in some-
thing other than cash, as for example, goods, lodging, food, or clothing." An almost identical
regulation is also contained in the FUTA regulations. Treas. Reg § 31.3306(b)-l(e).
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Illinois prescribed for the income tax provisions. '20 2 The court
strongly relied on Royster Co. v. United States,203 a Fourth Circuit deci-
sion, and Hotel Conquistador, Inc. v. United States,2°4 a Court of
Claims decision.
In Royster, the Fourth Circuit was presented with the pre-Central
Illinois issue of whether employee meal reimbursements were subject
to income tax withholding, in addition to FICA and FUTA obligations.
The court, in reaching the conclusion that they were not, analyzed the
three statutes as if they were in pari materia.205 Interestingly enough,
the Service in Royster agreed that the wording differences in the three
statutes were inconsequential. 206 In Hotel Conquistador, the United
States Court of Claims found Central Illinois controlling in deciding
that employee meal reimbursements were not subject to FICA and
FUTA.20
7
In addition to rejecting the Service's contentions that the statutes
were not in pari materia, and thereby agreeing with Royster and Hotel
Conquistador, the Seventh Circuit also rejected the Service's reliance
on FICA and FUTA regulations which provide that the medium in
which remuneration is paid is immaterial. 2 8 The Seventh Circuit
found that the regulations relied upon by the Service were almost iden-
tical to the income tax withholding regulations.209 The court did note
that if the Treasury were to issue regulations that "could pinpoint any
202. 623 F.2d at 1227.
203. 479 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1973).
204. 597 F.2d 1348 (Ct. Cl. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980).
205. 479 F.2d at 389-90. The Fourth Circuit, in a passage cited by the Seventh Circuit with
approval in Oscar Mayer, stated:
Concerning FICA. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101 and 3102 impose a tax for old age, survivors,
disability and hospital benefits and require the employer to collect such taxes from the
wages of the employee. § 3121(a) defines "wages" within the meaning of §§ 3101 and
3102 as "all remuneration for employment, including the cash value of all remuneration
paid in any medium other than cash." Concerning FUTA. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(b) likewise
defines "wages" as "all remuneration for employment, including the cash value of all
remuneration paid in any medium other than cash." For the purposes of withholding
income tax by the employer, 26 U.S.C. § 3401(a) defines wages: "For purposes of this
chapter, the term 'Wages' means all remuneration for services performed by an em-
ployee for his employer, including the cash value of all remuneration paid in any me-
dium other than cash."
Id., cited in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, 623 F.2d at 1226.
206. 479 F.2d at 390.
207. 597 F.2d at 1352. Hotel Conquistador presented an almost identical issue to that in Oscar
Mayer in that it was conceded that the federal income withholding tax was inapplicable. Id. at
1354. It should be noted that in Rev. Rul. 80-41, 1980-1 C.B. 211, the Service indicated that it
would not follow the decision in Hotel Conquistador.
208. See note 201 and accompanying text supra.
209. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(a)-l(e), cited in note 201 supra, states that the medium in which
remuneration is paid is immaterial. It is identical to the following income tax withholding regula-
tion: "generally the medium in which remuneration is paid is also immaterial. It may be paid in
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differences that Congress intended for the various withholding provi-
sions" then such regulations would be considered with some defer-
ence. 210 However, because the FICA and FUTA regulations did not
contain any more specificity regarding the definition of "wages" than
did the income tax withholding regulation, the Seventh Circuit held
that the reasoning of Central Illinois was controlling and found for the
plaintiff.
It was not long before the Seventh Circuit was criticized for its
decision. Just two months later, the Fifth Circuit, on similar facts,
came to a contrary conclusion in Rowan Companies, Inc. v. United
States.2 11 In Rowan, the Fifth Circuit criticized the Royster and Oscar
Mayer decisions, characterizing their reasoning as being based on "se-
mantic consistency. ' 212 The Fifth Circuit instead characterized the is-
sue as whether the Secretary's construction of the term "wages" under
the FICA and FUTA regulations was a permissible one.
213
The court found the regulations' construction permissible, reason-
ing that federal income taxes serve a different purpose than FICA and
FUTA taxes. The court further noted that liability under the FICA
and FJTA statutes was primary whereas liability was secondary under
the income tax withholding statute.214 Therefore, it concluded that the
statutes were not in pari materia.
21 5
The Fifth Circuit further found that Central Illinois was not con-
trolling in that "ease of administration and uniformity of interpreta-
cash or something other than cash, as for example, stocks, bonds, or other forms of property."
Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-l(a)(4).
210. 623 F.2d at 1227. The court added that such regulation would provide the "simplicity
and certainty in the administration of the tax withholding laws" mandated in Central Illinois in
that the employer would have notice of its withholding obligations. Id.
211. 624 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 247 (1981). In Rowan, the issue was whether
the value of meals and lodging provided for employees working on offshore oil rigs should be
treated as "wages" for purposes of FICA and FUTA liability. Because the meals and lodging
were provided for the convenience of the employer, were furnished on the business premises of the
employer, and the employee was required to accept them as a condition of employment, they were
excluded from gross income pursuant to I.R.C. § 119 and, therefore, not subject to federal income
tax withholding. 624 F.2d at 705.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 706.
214. The court stated:
Federal income taxes are used for general expenditures. Withholding is a means to col-
lect income taxes. FICA and FUTA taxes are collected for special purposes. They are
not general revenue measures. The revenues are spent primarily to benefit the employ-
ees affected. The employer's obligation to withhold and pay FICA taxes and to pay
FUTA taxes is primary whereas its obligation under the income tax provisions is secon-
dary. If income tax is not withheld, the tax is still a debt of the wage-earner. If FICA or
FUTA are interpreted to exclude an item, no revenue is produced.
Id.
215. Id.
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tion" were not a problem. The court noted that "most businesses today
utilize computers to calculate taxes and it is a simple matter to devise a
program that includes some items for one or two taxes and excludes the
same items in calculating others. '21 6 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit felt
that great deference should be given to Treasury regulations which
have been in force for a long period of time.
217
Due to the conflict between the circuits, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 218 The approach of the Seventh Circuit proved to be
the proper one as the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit.219 The
Supreme Court basically followed the approach of the Seventh Circuit
by following the reasoning it had put forward in Central Illinois. The
Court went through a lengthy review of legislative history and con-
cluded that Congress had intended to coordinate the income tax with-
holding system with the FICA and FUTA systems. "In both instances,
Congress did so to promote simplicity and ease of administration.
Contradictory interpretations of substantially identical definitions do
not serve that interest. '22
0
The Court rejected the Service's argument that Congress had im-
plicitly approved the 1940 FICA and FUTA Treasury regulations
when it reenacted the FICA and FUTA taxes in the 1954 Code, and
that Congress had thereby approved two different definitions of the
term "wages." The 1940 regulations, which were almost identical to
the present regulations, eliminated the convenience-of-the-employer
rule for purposes of the computation of wages under FICA and FUTA,
a rule which establishes inclusion or exclusion from gross income.
22'
By eliminating a rule which limits the scope of wages for income tax
withholding purposes, the Treasury Department thereby created a dis-
tinction between "wages" for FICA and FUTA purposes and for in-
come tax withholding purposes. The Court found that the Treasury
regulations were applied in such an inconsistent manner that one could
not conclude that Congress had intended to endorse different interpre-
tations of the term "wages" when it enacted the 1954 Code.222 Because
216. Id. at 706-07.
217. Id. at 706.
218. 449 U.S. 1109 (1981).
219. 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
220. Id. at 257.
221. The convenience-of-the-employer rule is the rule contained in I.R.C. § 119 which must
be met before meals or lodging provided to an employee may be excluded from his gross income.
See note 190 supra.
222. The Court went through a lengthy review of how the regulations were once amended and
that the rulings issued by the Commissioner were inconsistent and subject to many changes. 452
U.S. at 258-62.
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the Treasury regulations failed to implement the definition of "wages"
in the manner intended by Congress, the Court declared them to be
invalid.2
2 3
The Supreme Court finally has brought some order to a hotly con-
tested and confused area. As a result, the Service is finally drafting
new regulations which hopefully will define "wages" in a consistent
manner for FICA, FUTA and income tax withholding purposes. 224 In
the short run, however, there probably will be additional litigation
when taxpayers run to seek refunds of FICA and FUTA taxes which
were paid on nontaxable items.
225
CONCLUSION
The 1980-81 term of the Seventh Circuit was a relatively quiet one
in the tax area; however, the court's performance should be character-
ized as quite noteworthy. In Redding, the court finally held what many
223. Id. at 262-63. It should be noted that after the Supreme Court decision in Central Illinois,
but before Rowan, the Service issued Rev. Proc. 80-53, 1980-2 C.B. 848, setting forth the proce-
dures it would follow in response to Central Illinois. The Service stated that certain taxable fringe
benefits would not be treated as "wages" for withholding tax purposes where:
(1) The payments are not the type of benefit treated as wages under the statute, a regu-
lation, a revenue ruling, a revenue procedure, or a court decision; and
(2) There is a reasonable basis for the belief that such benefits cannot be considered as
remuneration for services.
This revenue procedure was not brought up in Rowan because the Service was attempting to
characterize an item of income that was not "wages" for withholding tax purposes as "wages" for
FICA and FUTA purposes.
224. See TAx MNGM'T (BNA) 81-16, at 15 (Aug. 10, 1981).
225. Such additional litigation may be limited. In December 1981, the Service issued proce-
dures for employers claiming FICA and FUTA refunds as a result of the Rowan decision. Rev.
Proc. 81-69, 1981-52 I.R.B. 26; Rev. Rul. 81-310, 1981-52 I.R.B. 13. Revenue Procedure 81-69
details the procedures to be followed and the forms to be filed. Revenue Ruling 81-310 addresses
refunds of FICA where either the employee has consented to his portion of the refund being paid
to the employer or the employee has failed to respond to a consent request.
IRS Commissioner Roscoe Egger estimated that the number of tax returns claiming such
refunds may exceed two million with over two billion dollars being sought. STAND. FED. TAx
REP. (CCH) 6887 (1981).
The Service has also issued procedural guidelines for its agents to use in assessing whether
employment tax cases should be conceded or contested. According to the Service, the following
cases should not be contested:
1. Cases of meal allowances or reimbursements, whether or not deductible by the
employee as a trade or business expense;
2. Cases involving meals and lodging that were provided for the convenience of
the employer,
3. Cases involving meal allowances or reimbursements of expenses incurred by the
employee as business expenses; and
4. Any other case involving benefits, allowances or reimbursements of expenses
incurred in the business of the employer, which are not deductible as a trade or business
expense of the employee. This applies only to the situation where there is no published
authority making clear that the item in question is a wage and there is a reasonable belief
that the item is not remuneration for services.
STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH) 8138 (1981) (Rewrite Bulletin).
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had long suspected: the holding of Palmer v. Commissioner that a cor-
poration's grant to shareholders of rights to purchase its property can-
not constitute a dividend because the mere grant of rights does. not
diminish the corporation's assets is no longer good law. It should not
be long before the Seventh Circuit is upheld on this correct position.
The Seventh Circuit was upheld by the Supreme Court on its contro-
versial holding in Oscar Mayer that "wages" for FICA, FUTA and
income tax withholding purposes must be defined in a consistent
manner.
Finally, on the lighter side, the Seventh Circuit was, once again,
correct in Birkenstock v. Commissioner.226 In Birkenstock, the taxpay-
ers presented the age old argument that they were entitled to reduce
their gross income to its gold value for tax reporting purposes. Like
many of its predecessors, the Seventh Circuit invoked the golden rule
that the measure of taxable income is in dollars.
22 7
226. 646 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981). The decision originally was unreported. The court un-
doubtedly decided to publish the opinion because of the frequency with which this issue arises.
227. For a sample of other taxpayers who have unsuccessfully raised this argument, see the list
of cases at 646 F.2d at 1186.
